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ABSTRACT
"Capitalist Economic Development in Appalachian Kentucky" utilizes
the methodology of historical materialism to study the generation and
reproduction of poverty in the Appalachian region.
Chapter 1 reviews the explanations of poverty that have been
suggested by missionaries and educators, liberal and conservative
"culture of poverty" theorists, economists, and union and grass-roots
organizers. A brief critique of these explanations is given in terms
of their functions in either legitimizing or challenging the process
of capitalist economic development.
Chapter 2 describes the historical process of "primitive accumu-
lation", the establishment and legitimization of outside capitalist
control over the region, and early union struggles against this control.
Chapter 3 describes the role that the United Mine Workers of
America has in the process of development in Appalachia. Beginning with
the unionization drives in the mid-1930's, the form of development was
dominated by conflicts and agreements that were made by the UMW of A and
the coal/energy industry.
In Chapter 4 the analytical tools of Marxian Economic Analysis
and Economic Dualism are synthesized to describe the structure of the
Appalachian political economy. Wage determination, maintenance of surplus
labor, capital accumulation, income and wealth distribution, and subsist-
ence in the political economy are described.
Chapter 5 describes the social and political "superstructure" that
has supported the economic structure in the region.
Chapter 6 briefly outlines the dialectics of future development.
Thesis Advisor: John R. Harris, Associate Professor of Economics and
Urban Studies
ACKNOWLE DGMENTS
This paper was written with the cooperation, guidance, and
inspiration of a number of people.
Judy, my wife, and I have spent three periods of time in
Appalachian Kentucky. Much of this paper, therefore, represents
a joint effort. During our travels, we have been provided with
hospitality and good friendship. Special appreciation is extended
to Doug and Willa Grant when they lived in Leslie County, and Lowell
Wagner in Harlan County. We have also been blessed with several
fine teachers. Among them are Bill Worthington, Granny Hager,
Hobert Grills, and various members of the Kentucky Black Lung
Association.
In addition, I wish to thank several people in Cambridge.
Professors Frank Jones and Charles Miller have helped support my
research since 1971. Professors Samuel Bowles and John Harris have
guided and critiqued earlier drafts of this paper. Sandy Williams
has guided me through the process of preparing the final version.
Though I take responsibility for its content, this paper
represents a cooperative effort. I hope it will spark furthur
questioning.
-3-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgment
List of Tables 4
List of Songs 4
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 5
Notes 13
CHAPTER 2 - ESTABLISHING CONTROL OVER APPALACHIA 15
Precapitalist Appalachia 15
Legitimizing Control 27
Rebellion and Union Activity 35
The Role of Appalachian Development 41
Notes 47
CHAPTER 3 - THE U.M.W. OF A. AND THE COAL INDUSTRY,
1932-1969 53
Notes 63
CHAPTER 4 - THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 66
Analytical Framework 66
High Unemployment and Subsistence Wages 73
Surplus Labor Maintained by Retarding Development 77
The Distribution of Income and Wealth 80
Subsistence in the Political Economy 89
The Changing Economic Structure 97
Notes 100
CHAPTER 5 - SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE 105
Subjugation and Control 105
Maintaining the Class Structure 108
Notes 117
CHAPTER 6 - DIALECTICS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 121
Notes 125
Bibliography 127
APPENDIX A - Historical Materialism 134
APPENDIX B - Advantages of Machine Coal Mining 136
APPENDIX C - Save-the-Union Committee Statement - 1928 138
APPENDIX D - Technological Dualism 141
-4-
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Prices in Perry County, Kentucky, May 18, 1932. 29
2 Place of Birth of 956 Kentucky and West Virginia
Miners 36
3 Coal Production: Appalachian Kentucky, 1892-1899
by Counties 42
4 Profits from Appalachian Kentucky Coal, 1916-1920
by Districts 44
5 1967 Unemployment Rate, 26 Counties 74
6 1963 Average Wages, 26 Counties 75
7 Saving and Investment Flows, Eastern Kentucky,
26 Counties, 1967 78
8 Distribution of Families by Income, 1960 81
9 Income Share by Income Class 83
10 Personal Income by Source 84
11 County Production and Ownership 86
12 Largest Mineral Owners 88
LIST OF SONGS
-Song Page
1 The Appalachian Hills 14
2 Coal Train Song 52
3 Coal Tattoo 65
4 Black Lung Blues 104
5 Strip Away 120
6 They Can't Put It Back 126
(Source: Michael Kline and Richard Kirby, They Can't Put It
Back, Dillons Run Records, Capon Bridge, West
Virginia.)
-5-
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Why are so many people in the Appalachian region poor? This
question has been asked by missionaries and educators, union and
grass-roots organizers, economists, and government planners since
the beginning of capitalist economic development in Appalachia.
The question has persisted because the condition of widespread
poverty and unemployment has remained a continuing fact of life in
the region. The political economy of Appalachia has undergone
dramatic transformations since the late 1800's when the development
process first began. Each stage of development has brought
promises of prosperty and the reality of exploitation.
Many of the explanations of Appalachian poverty have been
useful in rationalizing and legitimizing the process of economic
development. Included in these explanations are the theories of
the early missionaries and educators, of regional and industrial
economists, and of the "culture of poverty" warriors in the 1960's.
The early missionaries and educators in Appalachia believed
that the mountain people were spiritually, intellectually, and
culturally backward. Capital owners were largely accepted as the
custodians of property and the national wealth. Since the exploita-
tion of coal reserves was essential to industrialization, cooperation
with the coal barons in Appalachia and elsewhere was seen as an
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important act in the "drama of civilization."(1 ) The philosophy of
the Appalachian missionaries is summarized in the founding issue
of their magazine "Mountain Life and Work" in 1925:
"Northern and Eastern artisans and capitalists
are our friends and we invite them among us but we must
not permit them to crowd us out and take away our heritage
and birthright. There is no insinuation that this
heritage and birthright are being dishonestly taken from
us. They are simply slipping from our hands because of
our inability to hold them. We can hold them only through
education, skill and efficiency. These three acquirements
must become our possession if we would develop the mountain
resources." 2)
The War on Poverty in the 1960's revitalized the theories of
poverty of the early missionaries and educators. There is no historical
evidence, however, to indicate that applications of the earlier
theories had ever been discontinued in the missions and schools. The
War on Poverty formalized into liberal government programs the belief
that the people were poor due to lack of skills, inferior culture,
and insufficient general education. These deficiencies were believed
to create a "culture" of poverty that led to a "cycle" of poverty.
In addition to the liberal theory, a conservative culture
of poverty theory has also re-emerged. Some studies have claimed
that Appalachians who have left the region have higher education and
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skills than those who have remained. 3) This belief has helped
reinforce a more extreme view that inter-marriage among the
"intellectually inferior" remaining population has, possibly,
weakened the gene pool of those who remain. Proponents of this
view believe both that intelligence is inherited and that it is
important for economic success. Thus, according to this extreme
view, a permanent class of poor people is being reproduced from
generation to generation because of their low intelligence (which,
they believe, can be measured by I.Q. testing). The conservative
culture of poverty view is much more extreme than its liberal counter-
part since it claims that not only do the people lack the education,
skills and culture to move out of poverty, but they also lack the
innate ability to do so.
Economists and others have perpetuated the belief, particu-
larly since the 1950's, that the region and its people have been too
closely tied to a declining industry. The diminished demand for
coal in the 1950's and the resulting wave of high unemployment in
the region are cited as evidence that this is true.(5 )
Related to the declining industry belief is a theory developed
by Regional Economics called Location Theory. Economists who have
applied location theory to Appalachia,including those in the
Appalachian Regional Commission,have assumed that the coal industry
is declining and have focused their attention on the question of
why other industry has not located in the region. Appalachian
-8-
poverty exists because outside industry has not moved in to employ
those who have lost their jobs in the coal industry. Regional
economics' location theory claims that the Appalachian economy is
"underdeveloped" because companies have found ±t unprofitable to
locate in the region. Isolation and poor "infrastructure", the
theory claims, have been a major factor retarding the growth of an
expanding, balanced economy. The infrastructure which regional
economists view as important are roads and other transportation
networks to major market areas, water and electricity, prepared
industrial sites, supportive government services such as good
schools and low taxes, and, possibly, financial institutions offering
low interest loans. A low-wage labor force is usually assumed. In
other words, according to this theory, Appalachian poverty exists
V
because outside industry has not moved in to employ those who have
lost their jobs in the coal industry. 6)
The "missionary-educator", "culture of poverty" and "economist"
views of Appalachian poverty have tended to rationalize and
legitimize the historical development of Appalachia's economy. Implicit
in these explanations is the belief that the people of the region
are at fault for their poverty: either they lack the skills,
education, intelligence or culture to succeed or they have chosen to
live in the wrong place.
Another explanation, offered by union organizers and Appalachian
grass-roots organizations over the years has tended to challenge the
-9-
structure of the economy as it has evolved. The general argument
is quite simple: Ownership of the region's mineral resources was
"stolen" from the people by wealthy financial interests. Since
then, wealth has been extracted daily in the form of the region's
natural resources, particularly coal. Because of their greed and
their legally sanctioned ownership of the mineral resources, the
outside capitalists have accumulated a large share of the generated
surplus to the detriment of the coal miners and the region as a
whole. Thus, the coal capitalists' greed and their ability to
overcome the mountain people's resistance by mobilizing economic,
political, and police power has created and perpetuated the poverty
in the Appalachian Mountains.
This belief has been useful in challenging the generation and
reproduction of poverty and wealth by the major institutions in the
region's political economy; the others have been useful in legitimi-
zing that process. The major institutional actors in the region
have included the missions and the schools, the coal and oil companies,
the courts, the county and regional political offices, the U.M.W. of A.
and other unions, the banks, and federal agencies. Acting independently
and in concert, these actors have shaped Appalachia's economy.
The opening question - Why are so many people in Appalachia
poor? - should be rephrased to read: What have been the motivating
forces behind the generation and reproduction of Appalachian wealth
and poverty? The first question places the emphasis on individual
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characteristics which, along with the legitimizing theories, have led
researchers and others to ask the wrong questions about causal
relationships in the region's economy. Data such as - Average
education (I.Q.) Appalachia vs. U.S. average education (I.Q.);
average per capita income Appalachia vs. U.S. Average Per-Capita
Income; Industrial Structure (Infrastructure) Appalachia vs.
U.S. Industrial Structure (Infrastructure);Family Structure Appalachia
vs. Family Structure U.S. - are often sought. Ahistorical data
such as these help provide a snapshot of some aspects of.a region's
economy. Ahistorical data cannot, however, prove causal relationships.
Causal relationships can only be inferred from such data based on a
previous theory or assumption. Thus, if one finds that average I.Q.,
education, and skills are lower in Appalachia than in the rest of the
U.S., one can infer that Appalachia's relative poverty is due to these
factors only after assuming that high I.Q., skills, and education
cause economic success. Even if this assumption is universally
accepted, however, a proof would still not have been established about
the causes of Appalachian poverty. For example, suppose that one
found through historical research that a group of people had control
over all education and skill-training in Appalachia and that they
successfully conspired to keep Appalachians from acquiring much of
either. One would then begin researching how this group came to
control all education and training, why they sought to limit opportu-
nities, how they maintained their control, etc., in order to begin
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establishing the causes of poverty. Inferences based on theories
or assumptions are insufficient.
Historical research, on the other hand, can establish the
causes of Appalachian poverty. Utilizing historical evidence and
economic analysis, this paper will establish the motivating forces
that have generated and reproduced Appalachian poverty and wealth
since the late 1800's - the time when capitalist economic develop-
ment first began. The above theories of Appalachian poverty will
not be debated in the body of this paper; but the reader should
keep theta in mind as the historical evidence unfolds. Appalachian
Kentucky will be examined in detail; the timing of development differs
slightly for other parts of the region, but the same fundamental
forces have been at work throughout the central Appalachian coal
fields.
The establishment and evolution of the region's economic
structure will be analyzed in terms of the ownership patterns of
the land and mineral resources, the organization of capital and
labor, and the continuing transformation of the coal and energy
industry. The political and legal superstructure that has grown out
of this fundamental economic structure will be studied by reviewing
the creation and maintenance of town and county governments, and
the relationship of state and federal laws and government to the
region. Social consciousness will be analyzed in terms of the ways
in which missions, schools, labor unions, grass-roots organizations,
-12-
and television programming have either reinforced or diminished
conflict generated by the political economy. Finally, directions
for future economic development will be outlined by looking at the
forces at work to transform the region's economy and alter the
welfare of its people.
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NOTES
(1) Robert W. Bruere, The Coming of Coal, Federation Council of
the Churches of Christ in America, New York, New York,
1922, pp. 3-34.
(2) "Mountain Life and Work", Council of Southern Mountain
Workers, April, 1925; also see Helen Lewis, Sue Kobak and
Linda Johnson, "Family, Religion and Colonialism in
Central Appalachia," unpublished, December 1972.
(3) Niles Hansen, Rural Poverty and the Urban Crisis, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, 1970, p. 80.
(4) For the General I.Q. Argument, see: Richard Herrnstein,
"I.Q.", Atlantic Monthly, September 1971, pp. 43-64;
and Arthur R. Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scholastic Achievement?", Harvard Educational Review,
Reprint Series No. 2, 1969, pp. 126-134.
(5) Hansen, Op. ci., p. 64.
(6) Ibid., pp. 59-106.
(7) See Appendix A.
-14-
THE APPALACHIAN HILLS
Oh those East Kentucky hills, so beautiful, so green,
If they could only tell you of the awful times they've seen
Gutted roads and worn out schools, and they treat your kids
like fools
There's been hard times in the East Kentucky hills.
Over the hills, beautiful hills, there's been hard times in
the East Kentucky hills
But if we all united stand and you take your brother's hand
Better times will soon be comin to the hills.
Oh those Appalachian hills, so rugged and so dear
For generations ruled through corruption, greed and fear
Those that couldn't take a stand, they were driven from the land
And the strippers scarred those Appalachian hills.
Over the hills, beautiful hills, there's been hard times in
the Appalachian hills
But if we all united stand and you take your neighbor's hand
Better times will soon be comin to the hills.
-15-
CHAPTER II
Establishing Control Over Appalachia
Precapitalist Appalachia
During the early part of the 1800's, the Appalachian Kentucky
hills provided isolation, beauty, and sustenance for the frontiers-
men. In general, the pioneers of the early 1800's were native North
Americans who sought unplowed creek bottoms, a plentiful supply of
game , and a chance to get away from his neighbors . By 1830 the
influx of pioneers was completed and few new settlers ventured into
(2)the region until the latter part of the century
By the end of the 1800's, the society in the Appalachian
Kentucky mountains remained, in general, based upon hunting and
subsistence agriculture and a "kinship" social organization. Isolated
mountain families lived up in hollows and maintained strong kinship
ties. The neighborhoods that grew out of these extensive kin relation-
ships acted as mutual aid societies for the residents and the feeling
(3)
of egalitarianism among neighbors was very strong
The mountain values of egalitarianism, democracy and simplicity
were reflected in one social institution which they created - the
church or meeting house. The meeting house served some of the
functions of a civil court - to sanction the behavior of neighbors.
The anti-elitist bias of mountain society is reflected in the fact
that the communities insisted on untrained ministers.
-16-
In addition to game and land, the Appalachian Kentucky
hills possessed spectacular stands of virgin timber. Giant pencil-
straight poplars towering one-hundred and seventy-five feet with
diameters of seven and eight feet; white oaks five feet across;
black and white walnuts a yard in diameter; red ,black, and chestnut
oaks; armies of hickories; beeches; "sugar trees" and maples;
basswoods; ash, persimmon ,and black-gum trees; graceful willows,
sycamore and birches; and the evergreens, the hemlocks, cedars, and
pines.(5 ) According to Harry Caudill, "No region in the earth's
temperate zone boasts a larger variety of forest trees than the
Cumberland Plateau...the tree blights of the Old World had not yet
infested this forest, and many specimens were centuries old and had
withstood the fleeting decades without impairment.(6)
For the mountaineer in the decades after 1830, the
magnificent timber stands provided an important source of income.
The mountaineers cut their trees and delivered them to cities like
Cutlettsburg and Frankfort via the spring river tides.(7 ) This
income, along with farming and hunting, provided the mountain families
with subsistence that continued largely uninterrupted until the 1870's.
The society that had developed from this economic base was classless
and depended on kinship ties for mutual aid and support during hard
times.
The Process of Primitive Accumulation
Appalachian Kentucky by 1870 - and to a large extent until
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1910 - was not involved in the capitalist economic development
that had taken hold throughout many parts of the United States. That
era, however, witnessed a process of development that is a pre-
condition to capitalist economic development. This process is called
either "previous accumulation" (Adam Smith) or "primitive accumulation"
(Marx).
The concept of primitive accumulation is really quite simple:
In order for wealth to be generated from capitalist production two
groups of commodity possessors must exist and come together. One
group must be "The owners of money, means of production, means of
subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess
by buying other people's labour-power; and the other "free labourers,
the sellers of their own labour-power, and therefore, the sellers of
labour."(8)
In order for this state of affairs to exist a process must
take place which takes away the means of production from the
population, transforms the social means of subsistence and of production
into capital and the immediate producers into wage-earners. "The
so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than
the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production."
In the case of Appalachian Kentucky, the process of primitive
accumulation was planned and executed by outside financial interests.
Capital owners already existed outside of the region - men like
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Morgan, McCormick, Mellon and, later, Ford, Rockefellar - who
were interested in accumulating more capital through investment in
timber and coal. During the 1870's, investors in Philadelphia, New
York, and Cincinnati, and other northern cities began to hear of the
immense virgin forests and potential coal fields of eastern Kentucky.
Financial and industrial circles buzzed with talk of railroads to
the region. "Their agents were soon traversing the narrow, winding
mountain trails to seek out boundaries of the best trees and to buy
them cheaply against the day when the coming of the iron road would
automatically multiply their value many fold."(1 0 ) Some firms
contracted with businessmen in Lexington, Louisville, and Ashland
(11)
to acquire timber stands.
The capitalists' agents found an ownership pattern in the
mountains favorable to their purposes. The land in Appalachian
Kentucky had been chronically subject to title confusions as a
result of overlapping and inconsistent eighteenth century land
patents based on an incompetent survey by George Washington.(1 2 ) The
agents were thereby able to claim vast tracts of minerals and timber
through what came to be called "wild-cat surveys", that stood up
in court largely because of the overall confusion. In addition,
many mountaineers had laid claim only on the valleys of the hollows
in which they lived even though they considered the hills as their
own. Part of the reason for this is that they were not anxious to
pay taxes on mountainsides that could not be farmed.
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Teams of Surveyors were sent in by the capitalists to
survey land which they suspected were under tenuous title claims.
"These wildcat surveys usually started at the mouth of the stream
and embraced immense areas, including farm lands obviously covered
by prior patents."(13) The courts held that the land generated
by these surveys were valid as to all land not specifically
appropriated by the mountaineers.
In addition to the wildcat surveys, sales agents were sent
into the mountains to "bargain" away the land and resources from
the people. The commonly accepted image of this process is presented
by Harry Caudill: "In the summer of 1885 gentlemen arrived in the
county seat towns for the purpose of buying tracts of minerals,
leaving the surface of the land in ownership of the mountaineers who
resided on it. The Eastern and Northern Capitalists selected for
this mission men of great guile and charm... Their goal was to buy
the minerals on a grand scale as cheaply as possible and on terms
so favorable to the purchasers as to grant them every desirable
exploitive privilege, while simultaneously leaving to the mountaineer
an illusion of ownership and the continuing responsibility for
practically all the taxes which might thereafter be levied against
the iand.
The mountaineer, living outside of the business and
scientific worlds, knew little or nothing of the wealth within his
land. The purchasing agents, with their knowledge and charm were
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able to strike amazing bargains as this passage from Caudill indicates:
"We have seen that the mountaineer sold his great trees for a con-
sideration little more than nominal, but if his timber brought him
a small financial reward, his minerals were virtually given away.
The going price in the early years was fifty cents per acre, and
though the price rose, little by little, over the next three decades,
it rarely surpassed five dollars. Under ordinary mining methods
prevailing throughout the region during the years after 1913, the
operating coal companies were able to recover from one thousand to
fifteen hundred tons of coal per acre foot. This means that a seam
of coal five feet thick produced a minimum of five thousand tons
per acre! Where more than one seam was mined, a single acre some-
times yielded fifteen to twenty thousand tons! Even this prodigious
recovery left thousands of tons underground--plus the oil, gas and
other minerals. For this vast mineral wealth the mountaineer in
most instances received a single half-dollar."(
1 5)
The agents also "purchased" land and minerals which no one
owned. According to the Homestead Act controlling land grants in
eastern Kentucky, land was only available to private individuals,
not corporations. Not enough private ownership existed by the early
1900's to enable the huge severance of mineral estates which were
recorded. There is evidence that the outside agents devised a way
of dealing with this obstacle. They approached individual landowners
with an attractive offer. They would pay the homesteader for his
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signature on a mineral conveyance from a neighboring land estate
which no one actually owned. Such an offer was not easy to refuse.
Gross fraud also had a role in the process of land and
resource accumulation. By 1903, most deeds were still written in
long-hand. According to some, a large number of these deeds were
very restrictive in what they granted. Later, however, the
deeds were recopied into typed records by the buyers and reworded
to grant more privilege. Usually, the land owner learned of this
swindle too late to prove it, for rarely did he possess a copy of
the original.(18)
In addition to money, surveys, slick agents and gross fraud,
the capitalists employed a legal instrument to grab the land's
wealth: the now infamous broad-form deed. The broad-form deed
derives from the property concept of a mineral estate severed from
the surface estate - a concept unfamiliar to most European
countries but respected by English law. The notion was reshaped
by enterprising Americans to what has become known as the long-form
or broad-form deed.
One such individual credited with the development was
John C. Mayo, a native of Paintsville, Kentucky and member of an
old Kentucky family. His particular version, the Mayo deed, served
as the norm in Kentucky during this period. Mayo himself was
reported to have traveled around eastern Kentucky offering gold in ex-
change for an abstract of title to the minerals and an accompanying
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survey. (20) The northern and eastern capitalists took advantage of
the existence of this deed to secure the land's riches for the
coming of the railroads at a later date. The deeds allowed the
landowner to remain the "surface" owner, creating the illusion that
his condition in relation to the use of the land did not change.
In reality, however, the mineral estate created by the deed became
dominant to the surface estate: "The broad-form deeds passed to
the coal companies title to all coal, oil, and gas and all mineral
and metallic substances and all combinations of the same! They
authorized the grantees to excavate for the minerals, to build roads
and structures on the land and to use the surface for any purpose
'convenient or necessary' to the company and its successors in title.
Their wordy covenants passed to the coal men the right to utilize
as mining props the timber growing on the land, to divert and pollute
the water and to cover the surface with toxic mining refuse. The
landowner's estate was made perpetually 'servient' to the superior
or 'dominant' rights of the owner of the minerals. And, for good
measure, a final clause absolved the mining company from all liability
to the landowner for such damages as might be caused 'directly or
indirectly' by the mining operations on his land....,,(21)
The combination of moneys surveys, agents, gross fraud and
the broad form deed proved effective. The huge stands of virgin-
timber began to pass into the hands of the Eastern and Northern
corporations for very small sums of money. Many mountaineers yielded
their rights to trees for "enough money to buy an iron bed, stove,
-23-
rifle, coffee or sugar,"(22) and some "factory" clothes for his wife.(23)
Even the wilier mountaineers who suspected that their timber and
minerals possessed greater value than the prospectors claimed were no
match for the representatives of the Capitalists.
The mountaineers, particularly when they realized the impact
of the transactions on their lives, were not altogether passive during
this period. The mountains became blanketed by overlapping and con-
flicting land titles. Generations of court litigation emerged between
the mountaineers and the coal and timber companies. Before the
coming of the railroads when economic and political power was
consolidated under "King Coal", the mountaineers sometimes won these
court battles. The judges during this early period faced with
sympathy the stories of deception that were later to fall on deaf
ears.
One example of such a case was an 1892 suit by a mineral buyer
seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of approxi-
mately two hundred acres of minerals at 400/acre. The court denied
relief on the grounds that "the grossly inadequate price of this
purchase can only be accounted for upon the ground that the appellant
(landowner) was misled and acted under gross misapprehension." 
2 4)
Likewise the court took note that the agent for the buyer had informed
the landowner his surface would remain undisturbed during his life-
time although the agent knew a railroad was soon scheduled to pass
through. The judge would not condone such practices..."When this
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relief (specific performance) is sought, ethics are considered...a
contract ought not to be carried into specific performance unless
it be just and fair in all respects."(2 5 )
This attitude was again reflected in a 1905 suit in equity
before the Court of Appeals 2 6 ). The court refused to enforce a
contract for the sale of two hundred acres of minerals at $1.50
per acre. The landowner was perceived the victim of fraud by the
deception of his nephew, an agent for the buyer. The court's
description of these parties, respectively, is very revealing:
"...an old, infirm and ignorant man, unused to the ways of the
world; that this nephew, 0.F. Wolford, is an educated, bright, wide-
awake real estate agent." The legal notion of the "unconscionable"
bargain and the unequal knowledge of the contracting parties played
a decisive role in the court's refusal to endorse this particular
business venture.
Even when the courts ruled that the purchase of mineral
estates were fair bargains, the surface owner still retained certain
important rights in the early history of these cases. When Lynch,
the owner of the surface of one of two adjoining mineral tracts
owned by Nebo Consolidated Coal and Coking Co., sued the coal company
in 1911, the court c the seriousness of his complaint. 27)
It awarded Lynch damages due to the pollution of a stream on his
property caused by a slag heap that had been washed by rain onto
Lynch's surface from the adjacent tract. The court was not swayed
by the company's arguments that Lynch had notice of the operations or
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that it had the right to use his surface since it owned the minerals
below both tracts. The matter seemed simple: Lynch had agreed to
allow the extraction of minerals from his own property but not to
have it serve as a dumping ground for other refuse. (28)
Even for these "successful" early legal battles, and for the
other mountain people who managed to hold onto their land or drive
reasonable bargains for stands of timber, "...the welter of lawsuits
resulting from the wildcatters and the feuds were to dissipate most
of his new wealth without lasting benefit to him or his family. Indeed,
when most of his timber had found its way into the hands of absentee
owners he found himself in drastically worse circumstances than before,
for then a great feature of his environment -- a principle source of
food for his livestock and money for his pockets -- was gone insofar
as title was concerned, and, before many more decades had passed, was
to be gone in fact , leaving him a poorer , sadder, and perhaps a wiser
man." 1(29)
The process of land, timber, and mineral redistribution
brought about a stratification of society into the poor, the reason-
ably well of, and the relatively rich. Some mountaineers began to
increase their landholdings substantially during these years. Others,
who had sold land earlier and retained little fertile land and no
means for subsistence were forced into sharecropping.(3 0 ) "The
farmer-purchaser simply permitted the seller to return to his ancestral
land and to cultivate his fields as he had previously, but now the
tiller of the soil did not harvest the crops as his own. Instead,
-26-
he delivered one-third to one-half of his corn and other crops to
the landowner. (31)
By 1910, nearly a third of the people were sharecropping on
other people's land. This sytem of agriculture created a new
tenant class. As the rather primitive agriculture--utilizing no
fertilizer, cover crops, or soil conservation techniques--proceeded,
many of the landlords, too, found themselves possessing little
fertile land from which to gain a living.(32 )
By 1910 three-fourths of the remaining salable timber was
held by outside capitalists and an estimated eighty-five percent
of the minerals had passed out of the hands of the mountain people.(3 3 )
The arrival of the railroads was accompanied by the accelera-
tion of capitalist development. The mineral and timber wealth had,
to a large degree, passed into the hands of the capitalists. Equally
as important, however, is the fact that the population had gradually
lost its means of subsistence. These farmers and hunters as well
as sharecroppers recruited from the South would provide cheap labor
for the mines. With the preconditions for capitalist development
met by 1910, the coal interests began the process of building
"infrastructure" for the exploitation of the region. This infra-
structure included the establishment of towns, coal camps, missions,
and schools and the creation of a favorable social and political
climate.
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Legitimizing Control
The arrival of the railroads in 1910 was accompanied by
massive town-building efforts, carried out by the coal operators.
The main purpose of this construction was to provide housing and
subsistence needs within close proximity to the mines. The size
and character of these towns varied from rows of poorly constructed
shacks called "coal camps" to quite complete towns with an adminis-
tration building, school, hotel, rooming houses, a recreation hall,
and, inevitably: commisaries. The companies located their own
elite class of engineers, executives, clerks, timekeepers, doctors,
and accountants. The families of the social elite lived in houses
apart from the rest of the town, usually on a commanding mountain
bench. (35)
The bigger coal camps incorporated and became organized with
a mayor, schools, town council, and police and fire departments. The
operators could thereby control the property taxes that they paid.
"Judges, council members, mayors, and all their underlings were hand-
picked in the offices of the company, and their official hiring in
City Hall was nothing more than a ratification of decisions pre-
viously made."( 3 6) Miners and other company employees were required
to live in the company towns. This requirement insured a stream of
income from rents from houses,. post offices, and school buildings
and profits from the commisaries. These rents and profits alone
could insure that an operation was profitable.(37) For the miners
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and their families, life came to be totally controlled by the bosses
in the coal companies.(38)
In addition to providing increased profits for the coal
companies, the coal towns provided a means of controlling the
population. Missionaries and ministers were welcomed by coal
operators and frequently provided with houses and buildings for schools
and churches. (39) Since they owed their existence to the companies
they refrained from the social gospel and preached instead an "other-
worldly" type of religion.
Schools, likewise, were largely supported from company
"contributions" usually taken from 50 cents to $1.00 deductions
from miners' salaries. Teachers were therefore hesitant about
making decisions on school matters without first consulting the
operators.
Many families of miners barely subsisted on the income from
wages. In 1931, wages in Harlan County were as low as $4.00 and $5.00
a week. Even this income was not continuous. Many companies took
"cuts" for store, lights, rent, coal-, smithing, doctor, burial fund,
and other expenses from these meager payments. (41)The miners also
had to spend their money at commisaries; and commisary prices ran
thirty to one hundred percent higher than private stores. Table 1
shows the results of a 1932 survey of food prices. If a miner spent
a large part of his income elsewhere, he would be told: "If you can
buy cheaper elsewhere go and work there too."(43) A letter from
the Black Mountain Coal Company to such a miner reads:
-29-
TABLE 1
PRICES IN PERRY COUNTY, KENTUCKY, MAY 18, 1932(42)
(SAME GRADE OR BRAND OF GOODS)
Butter
Lard
Fresh Milk
Canned Milk
Flour
Rice.
Potatoes
Corn
Peas
Macaroni
Tomatoes
Sugar
Coffee
Tea
Eggs
Pork Chops
Sliced Bacon
Salt Bacon
Company Store
Prices
504 lb.
l5q lb.
20. qt.
10( can
70-95c (25 lbs.)
10o0 lb.
15( (5 lbs.)
10-204 can
20-25, can
l0% box
10( can
10, lb.
25-40, lb.
l0% box
24% doz.
25e lb.
40e
l6c lb.
A. & P.
Prices
23q lb.
6e lb.
150 qt.
5e can
45( (25 lbs.)
5( lb.
24e peck
9 can
10-25% can
100 (3 boxes)
25c (3 cans)
5c lb.
17e lb.
l8e (1/4 lb.)
25: dox.
11q lb.
25o lb.
7( lb.
Independent
Store Prices
25c lb.
8o lb.
15C qt.
7e can
48c (25 lbs.)
5o lb.
l5c (5 lbs.
5 1/2( lb.
15C lb.
15( lb.
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"Dear Sir:
On checking our pay rolls and books in
the store we find that you are not drawing very
much scrip. This is evidence to us that you are
trading with the independent stores. ...We are
furnishing you employment and pay you twice a
month for your earned wages...
I am sure that things can be adjusted and
you will give us one-hundred percent of your
trade. "1(44)
Throughout the Southern coal fields where the land on which
much of the towns rested belonged to the companies or were leased
to them, the right of union organizers to "trespass" was frequently
not granted. Furthermore, dwellings were frequently tied to employ-
ment at a particular mine. Most of the leases to these dwellings
included agreements such as this:
"And said Employee shall not harbor or permit to use,
occupy or otherwise be upon said premises, any person
objectionable to the Company, and SAID Employee shall upon
notice and demand of the Company remove any person there-
from objectionable to the Company, and failing so to do
the right of the said Employee and his family to so use and
occupy said premises shall thereupon immediately cease and
terminate" (45)
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While the towns were being built and reorganized, changes
were also taking place in the state's court system. Since the
early 1800's, Circuit Court and Court of Appeals judges throughout
Kentucky have been elected officials. With the coming of coal to
the region, their attitudes began to change.
Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Crigger(4 6) is an early
example of the type of court decision the Appalachian was to frequently
encounter. No longer sympathetic to the tales of the mountain people,
unschooled in business affairs and victims of those who were, the court
refused to cancel a mineral conveyance of one hundred and one acres
for $100 consideration on the grounds that gross inadequacy of price
was not necessarily a badge of fraud. The court held that the son
(both father and son were sellers) understood the consequence of the
deed even though: 1) he could not read; 2) alleged he had been
misinformed about the extent of his share in the minerals; and 3) had
been paid only ten dollars for this one-half share.
Not only did the court refuse to recognize the unequal
bargaining power of the parties involved in these mineral conveyances,
but it next shifted the burden of contract imperfections onto the
landowner. This course of interpretation began in 1925 in McIntyre
(47)
v. Marion Coal when a surface owner sought an injunction against
a coal company from building and maintaining houses, tipples, and
stores upon his surface estate. In denying the injunction, the court
devised a pernicious rationale: ambiguous deeds should be construed
most strongly against the grantor, and unambiguous deeds likewise
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strictly. The court held this in spite of the fact that the broad-
form deed was a standard contract contrived by the grantee (coal
company).
Unfortunately, McIntyre v. Marion Coal set the norm for
many court decisions to follow. Interpretation of the clauses of
the broad-form deed came to depend upon the activities of the coal
company at the moment. For example, "the right to erect thereon,
maintain and remove therefrom such structures as may be deemed
necessary or convenient for mining the minerals conveyed in the
deed" acquired remarkable significance. The court held that the
mineral owner could construct dwellings on a surface owner's estate
for miners he employed elsewhere in the county! (48)
Express clauses were given strict attention if coal companies
stood to benefit. When a deed specifically indicated that the
mineral owner could haul coal from other tracts over the surface
owner's land as well as dump slag from these other operations, the
courts upheld it no matter how harsh the consequences. I49) Sometimes
this literal treatment was accompanied by an obvious disregard for
the intent of certain clauses. In Inland Steel Co. v. Issacs, the
surface owner sued for damages to his house resulting from the
company's flooding his land and polluting his well in the process
of clearing its flooded mine. (50) The deed had exempted the mineral
owner from all liability for property damage except for one acre
designated as the surface owner's homestead. Isaacs and the company
no doubt made the bargain on the knowledge that the surface owner
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wished to continue his living on the surface undisturbed...the
importance of the one acre had to do with its use, not the particular
footage. Yet the court of appeals refused to look beyond the
express words of the agreement. It reversed the award of damages
and remanded the case to lower court for the determination of
whether or not the homestead was presently located on the specific
acre.
It is interesting to note, however, that the court did not
always hesitate to resort to a more flexible construction of the
broad-form deed. Not surprising, the surface owner was not the
beneficiary of its adaptability. When Mr. Case, a surface owner,
objected to the refusal of the Elkhorn Coal Company (mineral owner
of the property) to allow the construction of his home upon a pro-
posed electrical transmission route, the court over-ruled Case's
objection.(5 1) Although the transmission lines had been threatened
for a period of two years but never built, the judges surveyed the
five long typewritten pages of mineral clauses and reached the
following conclusion:
Clearly the defendant has the paramount right to
the use of the surface in the prosecution of business for
any purpose of necessity or convenience, and of this it is
to be the judge, and unless it exercised this power
oppressively, arbitrarily , wantonly or maliciously,
plaintiff cannot complain. (52)
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With Case v. Elkhorn Coal Co. the court established the
measure by which all future controversies over what was necessary
or convenient for extracting the minerals were to be evaluated.
The measure seemed boundless. The pollution of streams, the spewing
of debris, and the destruction of farmland were all deemed "necessary
or convenient". Even the most reasonable concessions demanded of
coal companies were unobtainable in court. When Flannery, a surface
owner, attempted to prevent the coal company (mineral owner) from
putting a tramway in front of his home instead of behind it, the
company won an injunction against him.(5 3) Similarly when Johnson
sought damages from a coal company for destroying his home in the
process of mining beneath it, his suit was in vain. 54) Not only did
the deed in question waive the landowner's right to surface support,
but using the Case standard, the company was also not judged to
have operated in an arbitrary, oppressive or wanton manner. In
fact, the court applauded the company for using a lighter charge of
dynamite than customary!
This new wave of court decisions that followed the arrival
of the railroads and accelerated development consolidated the
mineral owner's control over the land and resources of Appalachian
Kentucky and reversed the trend of earlier court battles. Paralleling
the legitimization of legal control over the land and social control
over the towns and mining communities was another process essential
to the capitalist development of the time: the creation of a surplus
labor pool.
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During this period, thousands of mountaineers streamed
into the coal camps from surrounding counties and the bordering
states of Virginia, Tennessee and West Virginia. In addition, black
workers who had built the railroad tracks into the mountains pro-
vided a source of labor. But the labor supply available locally
was not sufficient, so labor agents were employed to recruit farmers
and sharecroppers from other parts of the state and from the South.
Table 2 shows the place of birth of miners in Kentucky and West
Virginia according to a survey taken during the Winter and Spring of
1932. Almost 45% of the miners were either born in the same county
or the adjacent one. The other 55% were largely recruited by agents
from other parts of the South. During World War I, labor agents
actively recruited black sharecroppers from Alabama, Georgia, North
Carolina and Virginia. Sometimes black labor was brought in to break
(56)
strikes, and at other times simply to increase the supply of labor.
Examples have also been found of labor agents recruiting workers
(57)
from European countries as strikebreakers or surplus labor
According to Table 2, however, the general case is that the agents
found sufficient labor from the U.S. South.
Rebellion and Union Activity
Widespread rebellion against the coal interests in Appalachian
Kentucky came later than in other coal fields. The earliest recorded
strike occurred in 1897, apparently paralleling but independent of
the nation-wide coal strike of that time. Reporting on the magnitude
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TABLE 2
PLACE OF BIRTH OF 956 KENTUCKY AND
WEST VIRGINIA MINERS (55)
Kentucky West Virginia Totals
Place of Birth
Number % Number % Number %
Born in County in
Which They Now
Live
Born in County
Adjacent to One
in Which They Now
Live
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Maryland
Missouri
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Europe
Mexico
86
74
11
1
1
7
1
67
3
6
2
1
2
1
55
2
11
1
6
24.0 121
20.6
3.1
0.3
0.3
1.9
0.3
18.7
0.8
1.7
0.5
0.3
0.5
0.3
15.3
0.5
5.8
3.1
0.3
1.7
18.7
80 13.4
17 2.8
1
1
6
4
1
75
9
1
2
11
24
1
18
1
16
1
67
87
60
1
0.2
0.2
1.0
0.7
0.2
12.5
1.5
0.2
0.3
1.8
4.0
0.2
3.0
0.2
2.7
0.2
11 . 2
14.6
10.0
0.2
198
154
28
1
1
2
13
5
1
142
9
4
2
17
26
2
20
2
71
3
88
98
1
66
1
20.7
16.1
2.9
0.1
0.1
0.2
1.4
0.5
0.1
14.9
0.9
0.4
0.2
1.8
2.7
0.2
2.1
0.2
7.5
0.3
9.2
10.3
0.1
6.9
0.1
No Answer 1 0.2 1 0.1
.TOTALS 359 100.0 597 100.0 956 100.0
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of the strike an 1898 trade journal reported:
"The greatest hindrance of the year was the pro-
longed strike in the Jellico district. It commenced about
the 1st of May and continued with most of the mines until
late in the fall. Whitley Co....output in 1896 of
428,980 tons has been reduced in 1897 to 197,732 tons...
Knox Co. shows a loss of over 53,000 tons; Pulaski with
25,000 tons, Bell, with 10,500 tons; Carter, with 3,400
tons, and Johnson with 2,800 tons. The loss in the
southeastern district for the year is 314,011 tons.,,(58)
Production - which will be discussed in the next section -
remained low before 1910 and so did the demand for labor. The iso-
lation of the mines scattered throughout Appalachian Kentucky
during this period contributed to the lack of organization among
the miners. In addition, the nature of work was different for
the eastern Kentucky mines than for the mines of Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Mechanization came to the- mountains later than the other
coal fields. Prior to mechanization, the coal miner was a skilled
craftsman who determined which tools to use, where to work, at what
pacc to proceed, etcZ This independence helped produce pride and
a degree of on-the-job satisfaction for the early miners.(59)
Mechanization was introduced in coal mining for two basic
reasons: The transformation of the coal miner from a skilled craftsman
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to an unskilled worker and the reduction in pladution costs. Desire
for greater output apparently was not a motivating force in early
mechanization.(6 0) With mechanization, then, the miner's relatively
secure job became threatened by virtually anyone the mine owner
could recruit from the national labor market. In addition,
mechanization introduced the possibility of greater-supervision of
(61)
the workforce more along the lines of factory organization.
Finally, machine coal mining introduced the trend of diminished
demand for labor for the same output of coal.
Mechanization in the form of the coal cutting machine was
introduced in Appalachian Kentucky during World War I.(62) Instead
of diminishing the demand for labor, however, mechanization
paralleled the massive recruiting drives of unskilled labor and the
general expansion of the coal industry in the region that took place
in the years preceeding and after World War I. Therefore, though
the general demand for coal miners began to diminish after World War
I, West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky continued to have an increase
(63)in mining employment until 1928.
Union activity during the expansion of coal development was
fairly unsuccessful. The peak of union strength was reached in 1920
with approximately 18,000 members in Kentucky and 100,000 members
in West Virginia. Apparently due to disinterest on the part of the
national union and determined opposition by the coal operators, the
United Mine Workers membership dropped to an estimated 1,500 members
in Kentucky and 600 members in West Virginia by 1929.(64)
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During this same period dissatisfaction was growing nationally
among the U.M.W. membership over its lack of militancy and inability
to organize the new coal fields. A split began to develop between
John L. Lewis and the socialists and other left-wing groups within
the union. In April of 1928, 1,000 miners gathered in Pittsburg at
a mass meeting sponsored by the Save-the-Union-Committee, a coalition
of progressive and socialist miners. The "Save-the-Union Movement",
as it came to be called, quickly split into one group wanting to
reform the U.M.W. of A. from within and another group wishing to
form a militant, independent union of miners. The first group was
crushed by John L. Lewis; the. second held another convention in
September, 1928.
When the militant wing of the Save-the-Union Movement met
in September, they formed an independent union organization - the
National Miners Union (N.M.U.). The preamble to the N.M.U.
constitution called for equality of black and white workers and
"class struggle for the final abolition of capitalistic exploitation."(65)
In 1929, the N.M.U. began to organize in Appalachian Kentucky.
The misery and hunger in the coal communities, the physical
and economic oppression in the mines, and the lack of control over
their futures led the Kentucky miners to militant action. Findley
Donaldson, a native of Knox County, Kentucky, became local chairman
of the National Miners Union. He helped lead a massive recruitment
drive in 1931 after the U.M.W. of A. refused to support local strikes.
-40-
The coal companies retaliated with unequalled determination
and violence. Organizers were intimidated and murdered. The
Black Mountain Corporation discharged union members and drove them
from their homes in coal camps. Sheriff John Blair in Harlan
County became a hired gun for the coal companies. Miners accused
of murder by the companies were tried in "Blue-Grass" counties of
Kentucky where "hillbillies" and "niggers" were little respected.
Convictions and prison sentences followed. In the "Harlan Coal
War" and the "Battle of Evarts" the coal interests in 1931
demonstrated their military and political superiority 6 6)
The National Miners Union also made a strategic error while
organizing the miners. The N.M.U. organizers sent Donaldson and
other local leaders north for indoctrination sessions. They returned
horrified at the N.M.U.'s anti-American line and, particularly, its
atheistic teachings. The N.M.U. organizers had completely disregarded
the deep religious beliefs of the Kentucky miners. Donaldson and
the others wrote "confessions" condemning the N.M.U. and its atheistic
teachings. Newspapers printed the confessions and local officials
and operators spread them on handbills throughout the region.
Donaldson's confession, probably the most effective, ended with this
statement: "I condemn the activities of the Communist Party and the
activities of the National Miners Union as I fully believe in God
and the United States. I cannot succumb to the teachings of the
Party, "Banish God from the Skies and Capitalists from the Earth."
They say they "can make Jesus and sell Him for a dime."(67)
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The combination of superior military and political power on
the side of the coal capitalists and strategic blunders by the
N.M.U. crushed the union by 1932. With the passing of the N.M.U..,
organized labor militancy ended in Appalachian Kentucky for many
years.
The Role of Appalachian Development
The discovery and exploitation of central Appalachian coal
played an important role in fueling industrial development to
the north and east. In addition, the maintenance of Central
Appalachia as an essentially non-union coal field tipped the power
balance between coal capitalists and miners in the capitalists'
favor by 1932.
The excitement in financial circles concerning Appalachian
coal led to the massive exploration and "purchases" of the 1880's
and 1890's. By the early 1890's serious mining was taking place
and news of the mineral discoveries filled trade journals. Mines
opened in Bell and Knox County in 1888; with the hope that Bell
County might become the center for an iron industry.( 6 8 ) "Finest
quality" coal was discovered in Johnson, Whitley and Wayne Counties
and shipments to the East began to pick up by 1891.(69) In
1894, C.J. Norwood, Chief Inspector of Hines, predicted that
Kentucky would become a leading coal state since its coal was among
the best in the country. Transportation, he said, was the only
factor retarding development.( 70 ) Production for the years pre-
ceding 1900 is shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
COAL PRODUCTION: APPALACHIAN KENTUCKY
1892-1899 BY COUNTIES (71 )
Bell
Clay
Knox
Laurel
Pulaski
Rockcastle
Whitley
SOUTHEASTERN
DISTRICT
Boyd
Breathitt
Carter
Greenup
Johnson
Lawrence
Mageffin
Menefee
Lee
NORTHEASTERN
DISTRICT
1892
16,528
2,400
105,980
251,068
78,023
11,235
374:671
839,907
162,556
13,088
156,918
2,831
27,450
84,,785
850
4,260
1893
67,595
1,800
160,285
285,082
90,990
9,005
455,811
1,071,470
153,313
7,829
132,509
1,385
24,859
93,774
380
115
...... 16,850
1894
63,022
72,857
261,177
51,664
800
349,9282
798,804
111,659
85,266
1,572
16,902
86,497
49,312
1895
79,373
185,734
233,638
81,188
4,474
455,302
1,039,709
170,442
102,028
1,403
10,678
55,913
43,312
1896
89,534
217,039
288,494
72,537
428,980
1,096,585
121,022
2,405
136,066
854
6,762
47,474
1898
86,892
285,322
272,919
79,435
3,016
396.310
1,123,994
138,694
17,983
114,836
1899
132,674
244,091
314,244
100,579
566,831
1,358419
159,421
15,700
165,120
9,847
452,740 430,987 351,425 383,776 324,431
'f
.. .. .. .. ...... 00 a00
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By the time the railroads arrived in Appalachian Kentucky
the major coal reserves had been explored and the mineral ownership
had been acquired. Appalachian Kentucky's largest mineral holders
include names well known in the annals of United States Capitalism.
Morgan's United States Steel and the Morgan-McCormick International
Harvester Company controlled (and still do) virtually all of Harlan
County and numerous reserves throughout the region. 72) Morgan also
owned railroad companies to carry out the coal, and Morgan and
Insull utilities supplied power to eastern Kentucky.(73 ) Insull
interests controlled the Black Mountain Corporation in Harlan County
and the Peabody Coal Company in Pike County. The Mellon family
entered the coal fields in 1913 when the Pittsburg Coal Company
purchased minerals. Later, the Mellons secured the Elkhorn Coal
Mining Company, operating in West Virginia and Floyd, Pike, Knott,
and Letcher Counties. 7 5 ) Henry Ford, through the Fordson Coal
Company acquired large tracts of land and timber encompassing half
of Leslie County and parts of Pike and Harlan Counties. After
World War I the Rockefeller family gained controlling interest in
Consolidation Coal Company. A minority block of stock in
Consolidation Coal was retained by the Mellon-controlled Elkhorn
Coal Mining Company. (7 6)
By 1916, profits were soaring at the mining operations and
the investors were receiving a good return on their investments.
Table 4 shows the revenue-minus-cost profit rate and the approximate
TABLE 4
Profits from Appalachian Kentucky Coal
1916 - 1920 by Districts(7 7 )
# Companies 'Tonnage Production
Cost/Ton
Net Margin
Per Ton
Profit Rate
(Rev. - cost)
Profit Rate
(Return invest.)
District 2
1918
1920*
District 3
1916
1917
1918
1920
District 4
1918
1920
6,413,902
906,649
1,614,880
1,408,552
6,954,152
517,531
2,695,766
46,165
*
six months
34
6
16
16
104
17
13
1
1.97
2.96.
1.25
1.75
2.28
2.69
1.85
2.62
.72
-. 29
.15
1.08
.61
.92
.80
.84
37%
-9
12
62
27
35
43
32
21%
-8
5
37
21
31
21
22
I
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return-on-investment profit rate for eastern Kentucky Coal for 1916-
1920. The return-on-investment profit rate is lower since "investment"
includes all of the company's land and mineral holdings in the
region. Therefore, "return-on-investment" is an unreliable measure
of profitability since a low figure may indicate merely that the
company has chosen to mine a small portion of the mineral holdings.
Revenue-minus-cost is a more reliable measure of profitability in
this case. As shown by the table, the mining operations during
this period were extremely profitable.
Immediately after World War I changes began to take place
in the coal fields of Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois.
Changes in the demand for coal increased mechanization, and the
closing down of mines in these states created mass unemployment.(7 8 )
The militant miners in these states led strikes throughout the 1920's
against unemployment and worsening living conditions. The miners
of Appalachian Kentucky demonstrated no solidarity with these northern
miners and the overexpansion of the coal industry proceeded un-
hampered in the central Appalachian region.
Appalachian coal began to be substituted directly for
Indiana, Illinois and Ohio coal. Southern West Virginia and Eastern
Kentucky coal was transported to Chicago, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
Georgia, and the Great Lakes. This coal was primarily for industrial
and domestic use. Northern West Virginia coal also went to these
regions plus Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia (for export). This
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coal was used as railroad fuel in addition to industrial fuel and
domestic heating.
Thus, the development of the central Appalachian coal
industry provided a new source of coal to meet the nation's
increasing fuel demand preceeding and including World War I. After
World War I, substitution of Appalachian coal and labor for northern
coal and labor provided a continuing source of fuel to industry and
domestic users. Lack of solidarity between the union coal miners
of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois and the non-union miners in central
Appalachia permitted the coal capitalists to create excess capacity
in the industry. This excess provided employment for Appalachian
Kentucky and West Virginia miners and unemployment throughout the
other coal fields during the 1920's.(81) By the end of the 1920's,
however, high unemployment had become a permanent feature of the
Appalachian economy.
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COAL TRAIN SONG
Coal train a-comin, smokin down the track
Takin away our coal, but she won't bring it back
Till it's gone, it's solid gone...
You know I feel like cryin when it's gone
You know I'll feel like fightin when it's gone, it's solid gone.
Clinchfield coal train pullin so slow
Clinchfield, Clinchfield, pullin so slow
Hopin all the poor poeple won't know
How much coal you've stole.
When I die, lord, bury me cold
Down by that station N&W road
So I can hear old number nine
As she goes stealin by.
B&O pullin loaded down the track
B&O coal trains empty comin back
Taking all our coal away
And the profits do not stay.
C&O coal trains you give me the chills
Robbin the coal from our West Virginia hills
Takin our coal so your world can run
And your bosses can have their fun.
The coal you're stealin it once was mine
The ones that stole it are hard to find
I'd like to kill them owner class sons-of-a-bitch,
But I can't tell which is which.
All you coal trains pullin down the track
One of these days we won't let you come back
That'll be the day when the people's train rolls by
And we'll all be feelin high
Said that'll be the day when the people's train rolls by
And we'll all be ridin high.
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CHAPTER 3
THE U.M.W. of A. and the COAL INDUSTRY:
1932-1969
With the destruction of militant union activity in eastern
Kentucky in 1932 and the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act which "legalized" trade unionism in 1933, Lewis
directed a new organizing drive in the Kentucky mountains. Organizers
went through the fields telling the miners that "The President"
wanted them to join the union. They did not bother to mention that
they meant President Lewis - not President Roosevelt.
The United Mine Workers of America faced a different
situation and used different tactics than the National Miners Union
of 1931-32. First, "trade unionism" had been legalized by an act
of Congress. Second, the U.M.W. of A. under Lewis had become
strongly anti-communist and cooperative with capitalist ownership of
the coal industry. The Union, therefore, could not be subjected to
massive Red-baiting campaigns. Finally, the U.M.W. of A. had developed
better organizing techniques-than the N.M.U. Instead of open rallies
such as those used by the N.M.U., the U.M.W. of A. would secretly
organize at mine sites, announcing their presence only after a majority
of the miners had signed with the Union( ). Once the U.M.W. of A.
had re-organized the Appalachian coal fields in the mid-1930's, union
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policy-setting and activity shifted from the fields themselves to
Lewis and the national union. The future of the Appalachian miner
came to be determined by the national struggle among Lewis, the
Federal Government, and the coal companies.
The U.M.W. of A. by the mid-thirties' organizing drive had
become a very different organization than it had been in earlier
years. The United Mine Workers Journal before World War I carried
articles about socialism, "Our Socialist Friends" and class
struggle. 2 The U.M.W. of A. national convention had passed resolu-
tions since 1894 calling for nationalization of the mines.(3) The
last nationalization resolution was passed by the 1920 convention,
when Lewis was President. In the 1921 convention, however, Lewis
began to change the debate by stating that he supported some form of
nationalization or regulation of the coal industry. Since the Federal
Government could not "legally" nationalize the industry and did not
have enough money in its general treasury anyway, Lewis proposed the
route of regulation.(4 )
In addition to the nationalization issue, Lewis began to
establish policy on mechanization. In 1923 Lewis commented on the
overexpansion of the coal industry and high unemployment by saying:
"Shut down 4,000 coal mines, force 200,000 miners into other industries,
and the coal problem will settle itself. 5) Lewis' general principle
that "it is better to have a half million men working in the industry
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at good wages ... than it is to have a million.working in the industry
in poverty"(6) was to have its greatest impact in the central
Appalachian coal fields.
Lewis' personal beliefs came to be important to the economy
of the Appalachian coal fields because the Union by the mid-thirties
was firmly under his personal control. Lewis had been challenged
by militant miners during the 1920's both on substantive economic
and political(7 ) issues and on the issue of internal union democracy.
This movement, culminating in the Save-the-Union Movement in 1928,
(8)
was crushed by Lewis(. With the defeat of this internal movement,
Union democracy ended and Lewis' personal actions and beliefs
dominated the U.M.W. of A. and its members.
During the 1940's Lewis' United Mine Workers became the "biggest,
richest, and most powerful labor union in the land..."(9) Under
Lewis, the U.M.W. of A. forced the companies, through a series of
national strikes, to agree to support a Welfare and Retirement fund
by giving the Union royalty payments on coal tonnage produced.(10 )
Lewis, however, later bargained another contract: On January 18, 1951,
Lewis signed a national agreement that gave coal companies a free hand
in mechanization and consolidation.(1 1 ) Lewis apparently believed -
as he had in 1923 - that miners who would be laid off would find
employment in other industries. He also apparently thought that the
Welfare and Retirement Fund would take care of the older miners. 12)
-56-
Lewis was wrong. Industrial consumers, unable to rely on
their sources of coal, turned to increasingly competitive gas or
oil. Domestic (home heating) coal demand also had begun to
decline. In addition, the recessions of the late 1950's lowered
coal demand and made other jobs difficult to find for miners.( 1 3 )
While unemployment was raging in the coal industry -
300,000 men had lost their jobs - the union began to make
agreements with the large coal producers.
The national Union/Industry policy created mass unemployment
in the Appalachian mountains. In eastern Kentucky, employment
dropped from 62,000 before the agreement to 22,000 by 1954.(15)
In addition, during the period of 1950-1953, the number of days
worked in the mines averaged a mere 185 days - or roughly, six
months out of the year. (16)
Hundreds of small coal mines began to open, employing miners
left unemployed by the other mines. These operations began to grab
a large share of the coal market by underpricing the union coal
mines. The Union hierarchy feared that it might lose its membership
(who pay dues) if all of the companies went non-union. "Sweetheart"
contracts-agreements whereby both parties agree to ignore part of
the national agreement - became widespread in the Appalachian coal
fields. In some cases the welfare royalty would be reduced; in others
the wage level would be cut. (17) Pike County Coal Associates in
-57-
eastern Kentucky set up "dummy" corporations that would sign
Union contracts and pay nominal royalty payments. The miners would
be hired by a separately incorporated mining corporation. Cozy
arrangements such as these permitted the U.M.W. of A. to maintain
some membership in the region, while allowing the coal companies
to pay low wages and minimal royalty payments.( 1 8)
The union and coal companies also conspired to eliminate the
small operators in eastern Kentucky. In October, 1962 the union
headquarters announced that medical benefits would be cut off for
men who worked in mines that did not meet their royalty payments.(1 9 )
The process of mines going non-union, however, continued
unabated:
"Some operators leased their coal holdings in pieces
out to smaller operators to open truck mines (which
invariably operate nonunion). Many operators mechanized
their mines in the late 1950's and early 1960's. They
would shut down a mine which employed 800 or 900 men;
when it reopened with continuous miners and modern
conveyor belts, only 200 or 250 miners would be needed.
. Every operator in the area -- with the exception of large
companies like U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and International
Harvester and a few medium-and-small-sized companies--broke
the miners' union. Some miners fled from one mine to the next
as the operators offensive engulfed entire counties, finally
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to be left with the choice of working nonunion or
not working at a11."(20)
When it became clear that the Union leadership would not protect
the unemployed miners, the "roving picket" movement sprung up in
1959 and 1960.(21) The roving pickets began shutting down mines
going nonunion in Perry, Harlan, and Letcher Counties. In 1964,
this movement led to the formation of the Appalachian Committee for
Full Employment. "The Committee demanded a decent standard of living
for every east Kentuckian. If a man works in the mines, he should
enjoy union working conditions and benefits, but if he is unemployed,
the federal government has the responsibility to see that he and
his family don't starve."( 2
2 )
The coal operators fought back at the Committee's attempt
to organize the region's unemployed. The Committee's offices in
Hazard (Perry County) were fired upon. Miners were arrested for
charges ranging up to murder. Also , members of Progressive Labor
began offering aid to the roving pickets. In April 1964, when
students supporting the pickets were invited to attend a conference
in Hazard, Progressive Labor members walked around town passing out
copies of Lheir ne-wspaper, "Challenge. Based on the content of
"Challenge",the local paper carried the headline: "Communists Have
Come to Eastern Kentucky." Red-baiting became an effective weapon
in defeating the Roving Pickets as one participant explains: "This
Communist accusation became the operators' chief weapon of heaping
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abuse upon our Committee ... It was very effective in hindering the
Appalachian Committee from organizing the unemployed of this area... "t(23)
The Union and Coal companies were not satisfied with the
defeat of the Roving Pickets. The violence between the small operators
and the unemployed miners had not been sufficient to eliminate the
competitive small operators. So, in 1965, the Welfare and Retire-
ment Fund trustees adopted two new policies: the retirement age was
lowered from sixty to fifty five (at a pension of $85/month) and the
twenty-five year service requirement for a pension was modified to
require that a miner spend his last working year in a union mine.(2 4 )
In addition, the Union conspired with the large coal companies
to eliminate competition in another way. Many of the smaller
mines relied on larger companies to act as sales agents for their
coal. The larger companies, with their access to the railroads and
with their marketing departments were well-suited for this. By
previous agreement with the Union, the large companies refused to
market non-union coal. One such case is the U.M.W.-Consolidation
Coal Company conspiracy to eliminate South-East Coal Company in
Letcher County, Kentucky. 2 5)
The intent of the conspiracy was two-fold. First, the
nagging competition of the small mines would be eliminated. Second,
the unemployed miners would remain a labor pool for the big producers
who, because of this labor surplus, would pay them below negotiated
union wages. Even though the labor surplus has been maintained since
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the early 1960s, the coal conspiracy was unsuccessful in eliminating
non-union mines in Appalachian Kentucky; in 1970, only 30% of
the eastern Kentucky and Tennessee (Union Districts 19 and 30) coal
miners were U.M.W. of A. members.(2 6)
A history of the 1950s and 1960s is not complete without a
comment on profitability in the coal industry during this period.
The economic depression that gripped King Coal in the 1950's seems,
in retrospect, to have been a mere convulsion. Demand temporarily
sagged, mines closed down in order to mechanize, and coal marketing
shifted to electric utility companies. The low profit margins of
the small "dog-hole" mines that leased coal property from the large
land holding corporations during this period gave Appalachian
Kentucky coal the reputation of being a "marginal" or "declining"
industry. Many operations hovered around the break-even point with
many coal companies reporting losses. 27 )
This low profitability seem to have been, in part, a result
of the ownership pattern in eastern Kentucky. Most of these small
mines leased their minerals from large mineral owners, paying them
twenty-five cents per ton in royalty. Since these coal operators
would receive income of only $3.50 to $4.50 a ton on sales, royalty
payments decreased their (revenue-minus-cost) profit margins by as
much as 7%. (28) In other words, in order to understand the magnitude
of the surplus generated by Appalachian coal, royalty payments to
mineral owners must be included. Part of the reason for this separa-
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tion of income flow has to do with the manner in which royalty income
is taxed. This will be discussed later.
The end of the 1958 recession and the increasing coal demand
from electric utility companies ended the consumption crisis that had
hit the industry as a whole. Coal production in eastern Kentucky
surged almost ten percent a year in the early 1960's.( 2 9) Profits
soared also , as the following case studies show.
Virginia Ikon, Coal and Coke Company (VICCO) began buying
eastern Kentucky minerals in 1899. The company (now called Penn-
Virginia) owns 105,000 acres of minerals in eastern Kentucky,
Virginia and West Virginia. In 1964, Dun's Review and Modern
Industry called VICCO "one of the most lucrative investments in
America." The reason: VICCO that year reported earnings of 61% on
sales! (30) This trend continued, with VICCO's 1966 Annual Report
stating: "once again improved demand for bituminous coal, reflected
in higher royalty income, was the principle area of growth."(
3 1)
Another land-holding company, Kentucky River Coal, was
founded in Virginia in 1915. Kentucky River owns 190,000 acres in
Perry, Knott, Letcher, and Leslie Counties, Kentucky. In 1964 and
1965, income from royalties was $1,500,000 and $1,870,000,
respectively. Net profits for those two years was $874,500 and
$1,110,155, or just under 60%!(32)
One cannot conclude from these two case studies that land
holding companies in Appalachian Kentucky average a profit rate of
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60%. They do demonstrate, however, that the "big money" is made
by the land-holding companies, not local operators. If the mineral
owners also operate mines, as do Bethlehem and U.S. Steel, so much
the better: they can arrange their income to conform to the most
favorable tax treatment. The point to be made here is that King
Coal during the 1960's once again became a lucrative business in
Appalachian Kentucky - in contradiction to the prevailing image
of the industry as "declining" and "marginal".
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COAL TATTOO
Travelin down that coal town road;
listen to my rubber tires whine.
Good-bye to buckeye and white sycamore
I'm leaving you behind.
I've been a coal man all my life
Layin down track in the hole.
Got a back like an ironwood bent by the wind;
Blood veins blue as the coal.
Somebody said that's a strange tattoo
You have on the side of your head.
I said that's the blueprint left by the coal
Just a little more and I'd be dead.
But I love the rumble and I love the dark.
I love the cool of the slate.
But it's travelin down that new road looking for a job,
This travelin and lookin I hate.
I've stood for the union, walked in the line,
fought against the company.
I've stood for the U.M.W. of A.,
Now who's gonna stand by me?
For I got no house and I got no pay,
Just got a worried soul
And this blue tattoo on the side of my head
Left by the number nine coal.
Some day when I'm dead an gone
To heaven, the land of my dreams,
I won't have to worry about losin my job
To hard times and big machines.
I won't have to pay my money away
On dues and hospital plans,
I'm gonna cut coal while the blue heavens roll,
And sing in the angel band.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
Analytical Framework
In the last few years articles have begun to be written about
Appalachia as an internal colony of the United States. The
colonial analogy has been useful politically to help give people
a sense of regional identity. In addition, the colonial analogy
provides a useful analytical framework for viewing the process of
capitalist economic development in the region. The process of
colonization, according to Blauner(2) has four general characteristics:
1. Forced involuntary entry by the colonizers:
gaining control of the area and its resources.
2. Institutionalization of the colonizers into
local administrative organs: formalizing
control and removal of opposition.
3. Cultural imperialism: destruction of previous
values and morals through education and conversion.
4. Racism: the native population is seen as inferior
and is subordinated socially and psychologically
by the colonizers.
In addition to Blauner's four attributes, colonization can
be described as having a fifth characteristic:
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5. Economic dualism: the establishment and maintenance
of two sectors - advanced and subsistence -
within one regional economy.
Forced involuntary entry was discussed in Chapter 2 as the
process of primitive accumulation. The formalization of control
and the removal of opposition was also discussed in that chapter.
Cultural imperialism and racism will be discussed in the chapter
on the social and political superstructure. The remainder of this
chapter will be devoted to the application of the theory of
economic dualism to the Appalachian Kentucky economy.
The theory of economic dualism developed from observations
that a number of economists made of the behavior of capitalist
economies in colonies of advanced countries. In an effort to
explain different characteristics of these economies, the theory
of economic dualism became segmented into "social" and "technological"
dualism.
In an effort to describe the social as well as economic
intervention that he observed in colonialist countries, Boeke
developed a theory which he called "social dualism". Social
dualism, according to Boeke, is "the clashing of an imported social
system with an indigenous social system of another style. Most
frequently, the imported social system is high capitalism." Boeke
claims that an economic theory that attempts to explain such a
dualistic society must be three economic theories in one: an economic
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theory of a developed capitalist or socialist society; an economic
theory of precapitalist society; and an economic theory of the
interactions of two distinct social systems within the borders of
one society.(4 )
The theory of dualism states that the resources in a dualistic
society are immobile. Since resources are immobile, efforts to
explain allocation of resources or income distribution according to
theories that depend on factor (labor, capital) mobility will
fail. 5) In fact, it will be shown that investment of resources
must be highly concentrated in order for the dualistic system to
be reproduced.
Since non-capitalists derive their income from either the
selling of their labor-power to capitalists or through their labor
in the "subsistence" sector of the economy, wage determination and
employment level are important characteristics of the economy.
The theory of technological dualism predicts that a high
rate of unemployment, or at least a surplus labor pool, will be
maintained in a dualistic economy.
Technological dualism requires that the capitalist sector
and .the "rural" or subsistence sector have different production
functions. In this theory, the rural sector has variable technical
coefficients of production; and labor is the relatively abundant
- factor, leading to labor-intensive techniques of production.(6 )
Another way of saying this is that the farmers or laborer in the
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subsistence sector is free to substitute between capital and
labor in production; but since he has plenty of labor and little
capital, he utilizes his and his family's labor.
In the "modern" sector (mines, oil and gas fields, heavy
industry), however, production is characterized by fixed technical
coefficients of production and is relatively capital intensive.
"Fixed technical coefficients" of production means that for a given
level of output and technology, there is a certain combination of
labor and capital necessary.
In this model of the economy, technological innovation in
the advanced sector causes higher unemployment. The factors that
influence the choice of production technique are independent of the
size of the surplus labor pool and price at which labor-power is
sold. The magnitude of unemployment in this model is dependent on
the amount of capital stock available. Organized labor can fight
unemployment either by seeking expansion of overall production or
by blocking the introduction of more capital-intensive techniques.
(For a more formal presentation of this, see Appendix D).
The theory of technological dualism offers an explanation
for the existance of high unemployment in mining. Two additional
questions need to be answered: What determines the wage rate? Why
does high overall (in the subsistence sector as well as in mining)
unemployment and underemployment persist? An attempt to explain these
two phenomena is offered by the other half of the theory of
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technological dualism -- that pertaining to the subsistence sector --
and by W.A. Lewis in his analysis of economic development with
"unlimited" supplies of labor.
According to the theory of technological dualism, in the
traditional or subsistence sector, as labor supply increases, usable
land becomes the relatively scarce factor and the production tech-
niques remain or become highly labor-intensive. As all available
land is cultivated, the marginal productivity of labor falls to
zero or below (disguised unemployment appears). Given a labor
"surplus", there is no incentive to change to more capital-intensive
production techniques to increase output per man in the subsistence
sector.
Leibenstein argues that with low capital/labor ratios
common to the subsistence sector, a capital-intensive invention does
not influence the choice of technique. If investment in the non-
mining sectors of the economy could increase the productivity in
those sectors, why-doesn't investment take place? At least a
partial answer can be found in analysis of the labor supply.
W.A. Lewis defines an economy with an unlimited supply of
labor as one where the population is so large relative to capital
and natural resources, that there are sectors of the economy in which
the marginal productivity of labor is negligible, zero, or negative.(7 )
This phenomenon is not necessarily confined to the hollows or
countryside: it may exist in agriculture, casual jobs, and petty
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retail trading. The supply of labor is "unlimited" so long as the
supply of labor at subsistence exceeds the demand.(8)
Maintenance of the pool of surplus labor is essential to
the capitalists since the wage rate in the capitalist sector is
determined by the average wage in the subsistence sector. 9)
The maintenance of surplus labor and the process of capital
accumulation are integrally related, as Marx stated in Capital:
"But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary
product of accumulation or of the development of wealth
on a capitalist basis, this surplus population becomes,
conversely, the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay,
a condition of the capitalist mode of production. It
forms a disposable reserve army, that belongs to capital
quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its
own cost ... it creates, for the changing needs of the self-
expansion of capital, a mass of human material always
ready for exploitation."( 10 )
The use to which the capitalist surplus is put is the key to
the process of economic development. If the surplus is reinvested
in creating new capital, the capitalist sector expands, taking
more people into capitalist employment and out of the subsistence
sector."1 1 ) "The surplus is then larger still, capital formation
is still greater, and so the process continues until the labor
suplus disappears.(1 2)
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The potential for eliminating the labor surplus rests,
according to Lewis, with the accumulation of capital by the
capitalist class. If the capitalists fare well, eventually,
economic benefits will trickle down to the population as a whole
through full employment in the capitalist sector.
This scenario has not taken place in Appalachian Kentucky.
According to the theory of economic dualism, in fact, disincentives
for investment in the region exist for outside and native capitalists.
If income in the subsistence sector increases, then wages in the
capitalist sector would also be driven up. The same thing would
occur if the subsistence sector were eliminated. If wages are driven
up, then the capitalist surplus shrinks. It is not, therefore, in
the interest of the native and outside capitalists to utilize their
profits for capital accumulation within the region. The one possible
"sound" investment within the region would be reinvestment in mining
for the purpose of mechanization and technological innovation. This
would involve mechanizing the deep mines and introducing new strip-
mining or augermining techniques. Investment in new technology might
occur for two reasons: first, to increase the overall output and,
therefore, the capitalist surplus. Or, second, to cause technological
unemployment and thereby ensure a labor surplus from which to draw
miners.
Earlier, the importation of labor was cited as one example of
Coal operators' efforts to maintain a reserve army of labor, to blotk
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unionization , and maintain low wages. Surplus labor has also been
maintained by the companies in at least three other ways:
1. By directly blocking efforts by manufacturers and
others to create alternative means of employment
at above-subsistence wages in.the region;
2. by indirectly blocking development of other alterna-
tives through investment of its own accumulated
capital outside of the region; and
3. by indirectly blocking development of other
alternatives by influencing the investment policies
of area banks.
These policies were natural actions for profit maximizing
companies to pursue. The result of company actions and union
cooperation (described in Chapter 2) has been high un- and under-
employment and low wages for miners and workers in the subsistence
sector. This economic system has created a highly unequal distribu-
tion of income and wealth. All of these characteristics of
capitalist dualism in Appalachian Kentucky will be described in
the following pages.
High Unemployment and Subsistence Wages
Appalachian Kentucky's people have been plagued by high
unemployment and wages at the subsistence level. Today, counties
such as Leslie and Owsley have unemployment rates of approximately
-74-
30%. In 1967, unemployment rates for twenty-six eastern Kentucky
counties looked like this:
TABLE 5
1967 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
26 Counties
COUNTY RATE
Elliot 24.2%
Lawrence 10.0
Morgan 6.0
Floyd 11.5
Johnson 8.7
Magof fin 20.0
Pike 9.2
Bell 16.1
Clay 13.0
Harlan 10.0
Jackson 11.5
Knox 17.0
Laurel 5.3
Rockcastle 9.2
Whitely 6.0
Breathitt 24.7
Knott 23.7
Lee 7.1
Letcher 9.4
Owsley 28.1
Perry 12.4
Wolfe 14.2
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1967 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (CT'D.)
26 Counties
COUNTY RATE
McCreary 11.2%
Pulaski 5.0
Wayne 14.5
(Source: Appalachian Regional Commission)(13)
Not only has high unemployment been a serious problem for
eastern Kentucky's people, but pitifully. low wages have also
plagued the region. The desparate situation of the employed miners
of the 1930's, who saw their meager incomes totally exhausted by
scrip purchases of absolute necessities, may not exist today for
those who are regularly employed. Even for those who have regular
employment in mining or manufacturing, however, wages hover around
the subsistence level. A 1963 "Census of Manufactures" carried
out by the U.S. Bureau of the Census revealed the following average
hourly wages of production workers:
TABLE 6
1963 AVERAGE WAGES
26 Counties
COUNTY WAGE
Elliot n.a.
Lawrence 1.16
Morgan 1.00
-76-
1963 AVERAGE WAGES (CT'D.)
26 Counties
COUNTY
Floyd
Johnson
Magoffin
Pike
Bell
Clay
Harlan
Jackson
Knox
Laurel
Rockcastle
Whitely
Breathitt
Knott
Lee
Leslie
Letcher
Owsley
Perry
Wolfe
McCreary
Pulaski
Wayne
(Source, Appalachian Regional Commission) (14)
WAGE
2.02
1.53
0.95
1.34
1.49
1.12
1.63
0.60
1.63
1.43
1.21
1.52
1.20
0.75
n.a.
1.21
1.13
n.a.
1.24
n.a.
1.12
1.53
1.27
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In addition to the low wage rates, two other facts emerge
from the study. First, the average hourly wages were, in general,
a small fraction of the value added per production man-hour (vary-
ing from one-eighth to one-third) -- average. Second, there seemed
to be no correlation between value added per production man-hour and
the wage level taken on a county-by-county basis.( 1 5)
Surplus Labor Maintained by Retarding Development
Coal interests have blocked non-mining development in
Appalachian Kentucky both directly and indirectly. B.D. Sizemore,
a thirty-six-year-old miner, fired and blacklisted throughout east
Kentucky when he tried to organize a mine in 1965, comments on the
direct method:
"Shoemakers, shirt manufacturers, and mobile home
companies have all tried to set up factories in our area.
But every time they try, the coal operators keep them
from getting the land they need. The operators want to
keep a pool of unemployed people so they can lay off when
they want to and call them back when they want to. They
want all the human resources to themselves."( 1 6 )
Another example of this type of activity occurred in Hazard
several years ago when General Electric attempted to build an
electric bulb plant. The coal operators blocked GE from buying land.(1 7 )
Another example is an Arrow Shirt factory that was kept out of Harlan,
-78-
Kentucky. With the project ready to be finalized, federal infra-
structure subsidies were suddenly withdrawn.(1 8)
George Wooton, County Judge in Leslie County, stated in
1970 that he does not want industries to come because he fears
that they will pollute the streams or airl Judge Wooton's wife is
an employee of the Hyden Citizen's Bank and he is part-owner of
various deep and strip mining operations in Leslie County. Wooton
has been promoting strip mining as "county redevelopment" (it
creates flat land).
In addition to direct efforts to block manufacturing
development in the region, coal interests have indirectly blocked
development by their profits outside the region as do local banks.
Household savings provide a potential pool of capital from which
economic development might proceed. In 1969, the Appalachian
Regional Commission published a study entitled "Capital Resources
in the Central Appalachian Region." In this study, data was
presented on saving and investment flows and the composition of
gross private investment in twenty-six east Kentucky counties. The
saving and investment flows for 1967 were:
TABLE 7
SAVING AND INVESTMENT FLOWS
"EASTERN KENTUCKY, 26 COUNTIES
1967
(in millions of dollars)
Gross Gross Gross Gross Savings
Personal Corporate Private Private Deficit
Saving Saving Saving Investment
90.5 60.7 151.2 86.5 64.7
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(The data refer to saving for the year 1967 and not to the stock
of capital.)
Economic literature stresses the need in under-developed
areas for savings to increase in proportion to regional income
in order for economic development to take place. Usually, the
target savings rate for an under-developed region is estimated
to be somewhere around 12%.(20) Since capitalists are presumed
to save, the problem is generally perceived to be to encourage the
"native" population to withhold from immediate consumption and to
save. In the twenty-six Appalachian Kentucky counties surveyed,
13.7% of the gross personal income was placed on deposit in local
banks. The study also found areas where relatively poor households
maintained fairly high savings rates.(2 1 )
Another interesting finding is the statistic that 64.7 million
dollars left the region through the banks in 1967. Local people
generally cannot receive loans since most banks require double or
triple the amount of a requested loan as solid collateral. (22) The
study also revealed that the investment that did take place in the
region (86.5 million dollars) was largely in the mining industry.(23 )
In addition, the inflow of investment is highly concentrated "both
as to industrial distribution -- mining -- and also as to geographic
regions, i.e. counties, or groups of counties."( 2 4 ) The result of
increased investment in mining mechanization has, the study concluded,
meant that large mines have tended to expand at the expense of
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small mines because of the large financial requirements involved.(25 )
In short, the Appalachian Regional Commission study shows
what is predicted: capitalist accumulation tends not to occur within
the region; and when it does occur, it goes into labor-saving mining
techniques. These labor-saving techniques, in turn, have contributed
to the maintenance of a reserve army of labor.
The Distribution of Income and Wealth
The distribution of income and wealth in a region is central
to its economic welfare. "In both developed and under-developed
countries, growing public concern with income inequality has been
heightened by Marxian and contemporary radical stress on forces in
capitalist societies tending to increase the concentration of wealth
and income as well as by more orthodox studies of conflicts between
distributional justice and economic efficiency!' 26)
In a study for the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris found that:
"Higher dualism increases the concentration of wealth
by lowering the share of the least privileged 20 and 60
percent, by decreasing the share of income of the middle
class, and by increasing the share of the wealthiest 20
percent. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that, once
a sharply dualistic development pattern has been initiated,
further economic growth actually reduces the share of the
lowest 60 percent. When the dualistic development pattern
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is primarily foreign-managed and financed, higher GNP
tends to lower the share of the middle income house-
holds as well. In the absence of government interven-
tion, dualistic growth therefore increases the con-
centration of income..."(
2 7)
The distribution of income and wealth in a region can be
measured in a number of ways. One way is to break down the distri-
bution by income classes, as was done for the forty-four counties
of eastern Kentucky:
TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1960(28)
under $2,000 $3,000 $6,000 $10,000&
TOTAL $2,000 $2,999 $5,999 $9,999 over
No. 218,124 91,119 31,566 61,492 25,629 8,328
% 100.0 41.8 14.5 28.2 11.8 3.8
The above table shows that 56.3% of the region's families
subsisted on less than $3,000 income that year. This fact pulled
the per capita income of the region down to only $924 or 43% of
(29)
the national average. As a measure of the true inequality
generated by the region's economy, however, the above table has
its limitations. First, the above distribution includes transfer
payments, which can be assumed to accrue to the lower 60% of the
distribution. Second, the distribution does not include corporate
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profits, an estimated 90% of which accrues to owners and share-
holders outside the region.(30) And, third, even though the table
shows the percentage of people in each income class, it does not
show the income shares of each group.
An attempt was made to estimate the income shares by
averaging the income in each class. For example, the income
average for the $2,000 - $2,999 class is assumed to be $2,500.
Two possible sources of error lie in the estimates for below $2,000
income and $10,000 and over income. For those below $2,000 income
$1,500 was estimated as the average; for those above $10,000,
$15,000 was estimated as the average. Both of these are conserva-
tive estimates, attributing more equality to the distribution than
probably exists. The total income estimated in this manner comes
to within 3% of the total personal income estimated for the region
in 1959 by the Office of Business Economics.(3 1) In addition, an
attempt was made to estimate corporate income that would not be
included as income to families in the region. An estimate was made
for the coal industry alone, based on a 1969 study of the industry
by Richard Kirby.(32) Other corporate income in timber, manufacturing,
and other businesses also flows outside of the region, but no
estimates of this flow were available. Again, rather than overstate
the case, a conservative estimate was used. The results for the
44 counties were:
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TABLE 9
INCOME SHARE BY INCOME CLASS
INCOME CLASS CLASS %
(dollars) FAMILIES INCOME TOTAL INCOME
under 2,000 41.8 136,678,500 16
2,000 - 3,000 14.5 78,890,000 9
3,000 - 6,000 28.2 276,709,500 32
6,000 - 9,999 11.7 195,032,000 23
10,000 plus 3.8 124,920,000 15
Outside Corp. --- 43,200,000 5
(Coal only)
The above figures show more clearly the degree of inequality
produced and maintained in Appalachian Kentucky. The lower 56% of
the population receives only 25% of the income, the upper 15.5% of
the families receive 43% of the income and the upper 3.8% of the
population and the outside capitalists together receive 20% of
the income. Since transfer payments are included in the above data,
the degree of income inequality generated by the region's economy
is still grossly understated. According to the Office of Business
Economics, $120,403,000 in transfer payments flowed into the region
in 1960. Since most of this income accrues to families receiving
under $3,000 a year, the income share received by the lower 56% of
the population drops to approximately 13%. This compares with the
worst highly dualistic Colonialist countries studied by Adelman and
Morris.
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Even though inclusion of transfer payments in the above
table hides some inequality in relatives claims on locally
generated income, the table is a good measure of overall inequality
in the region's political economy. Since U.S. data for inequality
shows that the lower 60% of the U.S. Population earns 36% of
the income, and the richest 20% receives 41% of the national family
income, even inclusion of transfer payments in the Appalachian data
shows a more unequal economic system. (34)
Static measures of income and wealth distribution are generally
limited in their usefulness since they cannot show the reproduction
of inequality in a society over time. In order to show this,
income distributions need to be taken for a number of years.
Unfortunately, this was not possible in this study. However, I was
able to compile data that provides some insight into the reproduction
of inequality in Appalachian Kentucky. The Appalachian Regional
Commission supplied me with county-by-county data on sources of
personal income for the years 1929, 1940, 1950, 1959 and 1969. I
compiled the data for twenty-six counties and found the following:
TABLE 10
PERSONAL INCOME BY SOURCE(3 5)
26 Countics (th cands)
1929 1940 1950 1959 1969
Total Personal Income 133,031 138,565 420,378 458,661 832,4
Wages & Salaries 84,649 88,120 252,349 248,508 486,6
Other Labor 1,207 1,163 11,643 19,761 31,4
08
51
43
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PERSONAL INCOME BY SOURCE (COT'D.)
1929 1940 1950 1959 1969
Farm Income 28,375 19,917 23,286 33,379 35,842
Non. Farm. Propriet. 10,378 11,326 36,750 50,213 71,432
Property 6,209 11,248 29,201 24,641 60,061
Transfer Payments 5,112 7,731 63,627 74,094 174,221
% Wages & Salaries 64% 64% 60% 54% 58%
% Other Labor 1 1 3 4 4
%'Farm Income 21 14 6 7 4
% Non. Farm Propriet. 8 9 9 11 9
% Property 5 8 7 5 7
% Transfer Payments 4 5 15 16 21
The above data is not an overall distribution of income by
source, but rather a distribution of income by source among residents
in the region. From 1929 to 1959 the share of total income going
to wages and salaries declined by 10%. The increase in wage and
salary income between 1959 and 1969 can be largely attributed to
growth in government or government-financed employment.(3 6 ) Farm
income has steadily declined as a proporation of overall income
since 1929. The growth of transfer payment income has continued
dramatically since 1929, with transfer payments taking a dominant
role in subsistence living.
The grossly unequal distribution of income and wealth cannot
be fully understood without knowledge of the concentration of mineral
ownership. In 1969, Ricard Kirby completed a study of eastern Kentucky's
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coal industry, with particular emphasis on its ownership, taxation,
and profits.(37) Production and ownership of the coal industry
broke down as follows:
TABLE 11
COUNTY PRODUCTION AND OWNERSHIP
(based on 1966 Department of Mines and Minerals Data)
COUNTY PRODUCTION ROYALTY CAP. ROYALTY ASSESSMENT
Harlan 6.9 m. tons $2.67m $23 million $4.7 m.
Pike 15.76 2.3 52.5 24.3
Letcher 6.6 2.64 22 5.09
Knott 3.1 1.24 10.33 7.8
Leslie 1.47 .59 4.92 n.a.
Perry 4.72 1.89 15.75 2.68
Clay 1.15 .46 3.83 .65
Bell 2.64 1.06 9 .49
Floyd 5.47 2.19 18.33 5.43
Breathitt .84 .336 2.8 .5
Knox .213 .085 .71 n.a.
% LOCAL
.2%
21.
5.
12
n.a.
7.
30.
14
1.
38.
n.a.
In the above table, "production" means tons of coal produced;
"royalty" means royalty payments on minerals paid to mineral owners;
"capitalized royalty" refers to the accumulated assets of the
companies; "Assessment" refers to the mineral valuation as assessed
by the local tax assessor; "2 local" refers Lo the peceit of t&e
minerals in the county owned locally.
The two most interesting figures in the table are the
"Capitalized Royalty" (value of production for the year) and'% Local"
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columns. Comparing the market value of production for the year
with the total mineral assessment for each county gives some
indication of how heavily mineral owners are taxed. Weighting
the right column by the magnitude of the minerals in each county
yields a rough estimate of 90% outside ownership of the region's
minerals.
Estimating concentration of ownership in the coal industry
based on mineral ownership yields truer results than estimating
concentration based on tax returns as others have done. 3 8 ) Tax
returns data is based on reported income from mining operators.
Many east Kentucky operators are incorporated locally, managed
(and sometimes partly owned) by "local" men, but are owned by
interests outside the region frequently the mineral owners.(39)
The bulk of east Kentucky's mineral wealth is not only owned
by outside interests, but also is concentrated in relatively few
holders. This concentration is part of anincreasing national problem,
where in 1962 ten companies controlled 25 percent of the output and
thirty companies control 37 percent.(4 0 ) Today the largest three
companies control 27 percent of production. 4 1 ) Many of the
Appalachian Kentucky's holders own vast amounts of minerals in other
parts of Appalachia and other regions of the United States. The
following list of outside and local ownership understates the con-
centration since many of them share common owners. 4 2)
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TABLE 12
LARGEST MINERAL OWNERS
Company
1. Bethlehem Steel, Bethlehem, Pa.
2. The Berwind Corp., Charleston, W. Va.
(The Kentland Coal & Coke)
3. Kentucky River Coal, Lexington, Ky.
(Falcon-Seaboard Oil Company, Texas)
4. Ashland Oil
5. Ford Motor Co., Detroit, Michigan
(Fordson Coal Co.)
6. Elkhorn Coal Co., Carleston, W. Va.
7. Bates Manufacturing Co., New York
(Virginia, Iron, Coal & Coke)
8. Southeastern Gas Co.
9. International Harvester
10. The Big Sandy Co., Boston, Mass.
11. U.S. Steel, Pittsburg, Pa.
12. National Mines, Corp.
13. J.M. Huber Corp.
14. Occidential Petrol. Corp., Los Angeles
(Island Creek Coal Co.)
15. C. & 0. Railway, Cleveland, Ohio
(Western Pocahontas Corp.)
16. Kycoga Land Co.
17. W.W. Lindsay
Assessment
$5,305,813
5,152,690
3,567,951
3,121,652
2,575,319
1,961,810
1,789,749
1,572,441
1,546,500
1,542,420
1,438,550
-1,253,888
925,980
788,422
711,840
681,118
639,121
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LARGEST MINERAL OWNERS (COT'D)
Company
18. Kennecot Copper Corp., New York
(Peabody Coal Corp.)
19. Penn-Virginia Corp.
20. C.A. Lee
21. Bringardner Lumber Co.
22. N.Y. Mining & Manufacturing
23. Blackwoods Land Co.
24. Columbian Fuel Corp.
25. Mary Helen Coal Co.
26. J.M. Asher Coal Mining Co..
27. Harkins Mineral Corp.
28. Lawrence Tierney Land Co.
29. Pocahontas Land Corp.
30, Republic Steel Corp.
31. Morely H. Ringer
Assessment
599,790
592,858
588,000
511,350
473,950
451,400
439,032
368,133
356,490
325.000
317,847
284,380
280,305
259,000
Subsistence in the Political Economy
Subsistence in Appalachian Kentucky is possible in spite
of the lack of regular jobs. With hard work, ingenuity, luck, and
a good word from the local judge, unemployed mountain people can
survive through some combination of income from transfer payments,
part-time service work, farming, temporary government training programs,
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or public service jobs. The nature of this marginal life style of
a large number of East Kentuckians is difficult to present with
statistics, so a few case studies will also be presented and discussed:
Mr. and Mrs. Baker live with their eight children in a small
wooden home in Leslie County. Mr. Baker is a miner earning $400
a month when fully employed. Depending on the time of year, however,
Mr. Baker might be laid off from four days to two weeks a month. One
of the Bakers' children has cancer; but since Mr. Baker is employed,
they are not eligible for Medicaid. Children's Hospital in
Cincinatti and Frontier Nursing Service in Leslie County have given
the family large amounts of free care, but the Bakers face outstand-
ing bills of over $800. One month last year the Bakers were able to
receive food stamps; but they are generally ineligible since their
income exceeds $230 a month. Mrs. Baker makes a small number of
quilts, pot holders, etc., to supplement their income.
The Adams live in Perry County with their three children and
Mrs. Adams' mentally retarded brother and sister. Mr. Adams worked
as a miner in the early 1950's and went to Detroit, then Pittsburg
to work in factories when he could not find work in Perry County.
Since his return fourteen years ago, he has not been regularly
employed. The entire family lives off of the $190 a auuLh in welfare
and social security checks which they receive to support the retarded
brother and sister. Mr. Adams has a back injury and respiratory trouble
sustained in his years in the mines. Since these injuries only
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partially disable him, he is not eligible for disability payments.
Another man in a similar situation to Mr. Adams describes the
situation this way: "I can't do hard work, and I have a lot of pain,
everyday of my life. I might be able to do light work, desk work,
but hell, I'm not fit for anything like that; and even if I could,
where's the work to be found? Around here? Never in a million
years. We're doomed here, to sitting and growing the food we can
and sharing our misery with one another."(4 3 )
Rubin Napier is seventy-two years old, a retired miner in
Leslie County, and has Black Lung disease. Even though it is apparent
to anyone who spends time with Rubin that he is suffering from a
very serious respiratory ailment, the Social Security Administration
refuses to give him Black Lung Compensation. They say that his
ailment does not fit their very restrictive definition of pneumo-
coniosis or "Black Lung". Rubin receives $158 a month to support
himself and his teenage son. Charlotte, his daughter, also lives
in the home along with her two-year-old daughter. Until recently,
Charlotte received $80 a month AFDC to support herself and her
child. Since their combined income exceeded the $230 limit, the
Napiers were not eligible for food stamps. Charlotte frequently
did a full days' work cleaning people's homeb and irOn.ng clothAS
for $1.50 to $3.00 a day. In March, Charlotte began work as a
clerk/typist at a health center for $210 a month.
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Coy Combs lives with his wife and four children up a hollow
in Harlan County. Coy used to work three days a week at a small
mine loading three coal trucks a day. Coy was fired for not show-
ing up regularly. Coy and his family subsisted for a long time on
surplus food distributed by the Department of Agriculture, loans
from his mother, and an occasional day's employment splitting logs
into mine props at a local saw mill. Coy tried to seek disability
benefits but stopped when he and his family became eligible to
receive food stamps. When the "Happy Pappy" public service
employment program paying $256 a month started (this, and the Man-
power Development and Training Act and "Nelson" programs are the
same), Coy worked conscientiously, but irregularly (If his income
exceeds $230 he is ineligible to receive food stamps). After
months of employment cutting grass, repairing bridges, and working
on houses, Coy and many of his fellow workers were offered jobs out-
side the region. Coy turned down a job in Illinois as a carpenter's
helper in a shaft mine -- choosing instead to remain in the hollows.
Even though Coy is now entitled to food stamps if he has no income
at all, he occasionally does a day's work somewhere, or collects
gin seng roots for sale in town, in order to make some payment for
the stamps.(44)
Some miners receive income well above the levels discussed
in the above examples. For the vast majority of Appalachian Kentucky
miners, however, the level and stability of income is similar to that
-93-
of Mr. Baker -- even though his hourly wage may exceed that of
those subsisting on transfer payments and uncertain labor income,
his total income at the end of a month is not that different. His
relative economic position differs even less when the risk and
uncertainty about the future of work in the mines is taken into
account. Due to unsafe conditions, death always threatens. One
man in Leslie County began work as a miner at the age of eighteen --
and now, at the age of twenty-eight, he is totally disabled with
Black Lung, though he receives no compensation for the illness.
Politicians, government bureaucrats, organizers, county
officials, economists have all attempted to interpret the behavior
of people like Coy Combs, Mr. Baker, and Charlotte Napier. George
Wallace calls them "Welfare Loafers". Wallace's words are
strengthened when local people employed by OEO try to "organize" men
like Coy and they observe his firing for showing up only three days
a week and his irregular attendance in the "Happy Pappy" program.
Since the Social Security Administration doctors tell Mr. Baker he
is not totally disabled, he must be "lazy". When Charlotte went
into town to secure her AFDC payments, the County Judge told her that
she was in her situation because her appearance and odor made her
unattractive to local working men.
Economists have observed the behavior of men like Combs and
Baker in underdeveloped countries, saying that such people have a
"backward bending supply curve of effort." Higgins believes that this
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behavior is attributable to what he calls a "demonstration effect"
provided by the ability of people to move from one standard of living
to another as a result of their own extra effort.(4 5)
One east Kentucky mother put it this way:
"They told you over in Washington that you should just
go and tell those people to organize themselves and decide
they're a community, and then they can take advantage of this
program and the next one that the government has for
communities. So you came and told us, and so did others;
and then we did what Washington told us to do. We got a
few dollars together, to plan for things, and we met and
talked and applied for grants and programs and aid, any aid
we could get. But suddenly the War on Poverty was over.
They told you that there wasn't any money ... I hate to say
it, but like my husband said we knew all along that was
going to be the way it would come out.
An organizer in West Virginia and east Kentucky describes
his efforts: "You get to talking with them, and they tell you they'll
help, and they do. But after a while they find it hard to get
other people to go along, because people around here are plain scared;
they're afraid they'll be cut from welfare, or their kids won't be
picked up by the bus, or won't get their free lunch, or a hundred
other things will happen that the courthouse crowd can do to you.
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Another East Kentuckian comments: "They near die down there,
our men, but they try to live; and that's all they want out of life
actually: a chance to stay alive and have a little money in their
pockets. If you ask me, a lot of the way miners act can be
explained when you stop and think that they are people who are walk-
ing on thin ice every second, and they could drown. When you're
almost drowning, you don't have time to feel sorry for yourself and
you don't talk too much and you go about your business. And if you
like it here besides -- not in the mines but in the county, where
you've grown up -- then you feel even more that it's best to keep
your mouth shut and keep from drowning, and then you won't have to
go and leave here, because that is like drowning too."
Robert Coles comments on the attitudes of mountain people:
"I have talked with enough children in the mountains
to know that at the age of five or six, mountain children
still have their dreams of glory and conquest, of advance-
ment and accomplishment. Soon, though, they "learn" and
in this case they learn something "life" teaches rather
than schools; that is to say, they learn the futility of
learning, the absurdity of ambition. They also learn
about the hypocricy of others and about their own desperate
weakness -- a vulnerability that will stay with them until
they die, no matter what words and slogans and promises are
directed their way. Who, then, is to say that such people
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are"suspicious" or "doubtful" or "egocentric" or "depressed"
or "now oriented", and all the other things they are called?
Why don't we simply summarize the problem and call them
"realistic", which means smart about the world, plain and
simple smart about their world." 4 9 )
Part of being "realistic" is understanding the control that
county officials have over access to income -- whether it be through
(50) ijobs or transfer payments. 'In a region that lacks a well-
developed and strongly diversified economy, a school system can become
a major source of money and work and favors, and a sheriff and his
men can be a law unto themselves ... In some counties of Kentucky and
West Virginia one or two families run everything, they control the
judge's office and the sheriff's office and they have their man as
the superintendent of schools..It is impossible for those who live
scattered up the hollows and creeks to defy such "authorities"
without one or several harsh penalties..."(51)
The county judge can also be a formidable obstacle to a better
life in the mountains. Men in Leslie County who are known to have
voted against the county judge in the last election do not even bother
to apply for a job with the Operation Mainstream Program. The judge
also can secure summer employment in the Neighborhood Youth Corps
for teenage sons and daughters, jobs on work crews when the Appalachian
Regional Commission builds highways through the county, and positions
in the county government and local offices of federal and state agencies.
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The power of the judge and other county officials even extends to
welfare, as a Perry County coal operator comments: "Welfare is a
business here, not the right of a citizen who needs help and is
entitled to it. No wonder a lot of people have contempt for welfare,
even if they'll accept the money. They know that the county
officials use welfare to stay in power, to buy votes and to punish
enemies." (52)
Since employment in government-financed programs is becoming
an increasingly important source of stable wage and salary income, (53)
access to these jobs plays an important role in upward mobility in
the region. Frequently, wives and other close relatives of county
officials and local businessmen occupy important positions in
Community Action Programs, Mental Health Centers, Welfare offices,
the public and vocational schools, the court house, job training
programs, and Head Start Centers. The large pool of unemployed,
however, have faced a very small and highly restricted labor "market".
The Changing Economic Structure
Since the early 1960's strip mining has begun to be a factor
in Appalachian Kentucky's economic development. Toward the end of
the decade, strip mining development began to accelerate: in 1968,
43,450,858 tons of underground coal and 11,394,328 tons of strip
coal were produced in eastern Kentucky. In 1970, underground coal
production remained stable at 43,243,000 tons, but strip coal production
increased to 29,259,000 tons.( 5 4)
-98-
The general tendency in Appalachian strip mining has been for
the mineral companies to lease their minerals to local coal operators.
These operators, in turn, contract with strip mining machine companies,
and with local truck drivers or coal truck owners. The only local
employment demand generated by strip mining is, generally, for truck
drivers. The machine operators frequently come in with the strip
mine machine company.
This tendency to lease small tracts of minerals to local
operators may be coming to an end. With the rapidly increasing demand
for coal 5 5), the large mineral owners may begin to lease to large
operators or may even strip mine themselves.
In the short-run ,strip mining provides some employment for
local people. If strip mining came to dominate development in
Appalachian Kentucky, the demand for labor and the desire to maintain
a surplus labor pool would change dramatically. At present production
levels, the demand for labor would be approximately one-quarter of
what it is now. Also, trained machine operators are required - and
the tendency has been to not hire local talent.
"Surplus labor" has also begun to become a nuisance to the strip
mining interests. A population has to live somewhere - and that some-
where in eastern Kentucky happens to be up the holluws and un the
hillsides where the mineral owners wish to strip mine. Since strip
mined land in eastern Kentucky cannot be reclaimed (due to the steep-
ness of the hills), strip mining renders the land uninhabitable. This
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basic conflict between strip mining developers and residents who
want a desirable environment and a place to live in the mountains
is unavoidable.
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BLACK LUNG BLUES
I went to see my doctor cause I couldn't get my breath
He said, boy, you got something could well mean your death
Pneucomconiosis, Black Lung Blues---
You get the one, get the other, either way you lose.
I've always been a miner, breathed coal dust all my life
Too old to learn a new trade, what can I tell my wife,
Pneucomconiosis, Black Lung Blues---
You get the one, get the other, either way you lose.
I'll tell nobody nothin, I'll just keep working on
The kids need all their schoolin before I'm dead and gone
Pneucomconiosis, Black Lung Blues---
You get the one, get the other, either way you lose.
When I get up to heaven, St. Peter's going to cry
When I tell him the reason this poor boy had to die,
Pneucomconiosis, Black Lung Blues---
You get the one, get the other, either way you lose.
Pneu--com--coke--y--nosis, Black Lung Blues
I'll lay down my pick and shovel, lose them Black Lung Blues
Pneucomconiosis, Black Lung Blues---
You get the one, get the other, either way you lose.
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CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE
Parallel to the development of the basic economic structure
in Appalachia, a complex of supportive institutions and beliefs
has evolved. This complex of institutions and beliefs will be
called in this paper the "social and political superstructure".
This social and political superstructure has served two primary
functions in the Appalachian development process: the subjugation
and control of the mountain people and the maintenance of the class
structure within the mountains and in the United States as a whole.
Subjugation and Control
The early educators and missionaries in the mountains
performed an important function in the development process: "to
legitimize the exploitation, eliminate some of the worst abuses,
and to educate and change values so that the people would accept
the new ways."(l) The early missions and schools focused their
attention on molding the character of the young and preparing
them for "efficient life-work". These missionary and "settlement"
schools were successful in educating a whole generation of teachers
and middle class leaders for the mountains."(2) For the children
as a whole, however, they either urged them away from the mountains
or overwhelmed them with hopeless discouragement.
"The churches and schools gave some support to
certain harmless aspects of native culture, they started
the public school system, and they also changed, reformed,
uplifted the people and taught them the values of organiza-
tion, planning, hard work, and thrift. In so doing,
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they legitimized the industrial process by blaming the ills
of the system on the mountaineer himself. He must learn
to be more "cagey".....he must learn to be more thrifty
and hard-working and respectful and cooperate with the
mine owners. Although some of the missionaries saw
clearly the exploitation, they still had great fait
in progress and the benefits of industrialization." '
Implicit in the process of education and conversion of the
mountain people has been the underlying belief that the Appalachians
as a group are inferior mentally and culturally. In the early
nineteen-thirties Stanford-Binet I.Q. tests were administered
to mountain children. Psychologists concluded from their
performance that they were, as a group, mentally retarded. Some peo-
ple questioned these results, stating that the language and
symbols used in the test were foreign to the mountain children.
The general debate, however, focused on whether the children were
mentally retarded because of environment or genetic make-up.
Whatever the primary cause, the general conclusion was that mountain
life and mountain genes created dull minds. 5)
This early view of the inferior hillbilly has been perpetuated
in the minds of the general public through books, articles, and
television programs. People have chuckled at Al Capp's "Li'l
Abner" for years in the nation's newspapers. Capp's retarded,
ignorant, and comical hillbilly image has been reproduced for the
television audience on the serial, "The Beverly Hillbilli#,"
Jethro and Ellie Mae are not what one would call ideal role models
for Appalachia's children.
In addition, a new wave of I.Q. testing seems to be approach-
ing. Recently, the Nixon administration eliminated funding for the
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Kentucky Infant and Pre-School Program (KIPP) which services A.F.D.C.
children. There were, however, four program components exempt
from the cuts: foster care, drug addiction, alcoholism, and mental
retardation. The KIPP staff is now discussing and planning a new
wave of I.Q. examinations since they feel that they can find many
children who they can classify as "mentally retarded". The purpose
of this testing is to classify a large number of eastern Kentucky's
children as mentally retarded in order to increase the program's
funding. (6)
If carried out on a large scale throughout Appalachia, this
new wave of testing may lead to the legitimization of the idea
that Appalachians are poor because of their low mental abilities.
This IQ theory of poverty has been proposed widely in recent
years as an explanation of Black poverty; there is no reason to
believe that social scientists and psychologists will not attempt
to apply it again to the Appalachian experience.
The subjugation and control of the Appalachian people has
frequently been more direct than the religious, cultural, and
intellectual methods. The prime example of direct subjugation
and control has been the use of police power.
Brutal police action by local "deputized" thugs, the National
Guard, and the Kentucky State Police has attempted in
possible to halt organization against mining interests. Their
efforts have included intimidation, bombings of union meetings,
individual and group murder. (8) Police intervention did not end
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in the 1930's. During the series of conflicts between miners and
the companies in the 1950's, company guards and State Police killed
and wounded miners; and numerous strikers were framed and convicted
of false charges. 9 In April, 1964, Willie Couch led a U.M.W.
strike at the Blue Diamond mine and recounts: "When we set up
our picket line the company brought in twenty-five or thirty
carloads full of state police armed with machine guns and tear
gas. The troopers and company gun thugs kept us away from the
strikebreakers. Some even drove the strike breakers through
our picket lines in their state patrol cars. But if we tried
anything, the police arrested us and beat us up...''lA05
Today, conflicts with coal interests continue; but
usually between stripmining operations and individual residents
or citizens' groups like "Save Our Kentucky" and "Save Our
Cumberland Mountains". Police intervention in these conflicts
has resulted in death,(11) and the physical removal of people from
their homes or stripmine sites. (12) Sometimes, the state
police or local sheriffs stand by while company guards brutalize
demonstrators or people protecting their land.
Maintaining the Class Structure
It is impossible to quantitatively "sum up" the impact that
local, state, and federal government has had on the Appalachian and
U. S. class structure. There is substantial evidence, however,
that these institutions have performed an important role in the creation
and reproduction of the social relations of production in Appalachian
Kentucky.
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Government involvement in Appalachian Kentucky began
before the American Revolution with extensive land surveys by
young men like George Washington.(13) Concerted efforts followed
to remove the native Cherokee Indians from their homeland.(14)
The settlers who came in after the removal of the Cherokees were to
have relatively unhampered settlement until the 1870's. Court
recognition of the "wildcat" surveys and the creation of the
broad-form deed helped establish a "legal" claim on the region's
wealth by outside capitalist interests. Coal town incorporation
established capitalist control of town and country law and
favorable property taxation.
The impact of low property taxation can be illustrated by
the case of VICCO. In 1966, with its net income at $1,470,000
(above 60% profit), and property valued at $13,100,000, VICCO
paid a total of $42,390 in property taxes.
The failure of the federal government to enforce mine
safety regulations and to grant Black Lung Compensation to
East Kentucky miners provides further examples of government
bias in favor of mining interests. The December 1970 Hurricane
Creek Mine Disaster in Hyden that killed thirty eight men
serves as a reminder that the conditions that have killed
thousands of East Kentucky miners over the years still exist.
(Following the disaster, the man responsible for safety in the
mine was hired as a federal mine inspecter.) (16) In the past,
the miners have also had to battle their own Union on the issue
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of health and safety. Arnold Miller, the new U.M.W. of A. President
has stated that because of the federal failure to enforce safety,
the Union itself will take action to make coal mining safe.
In addition to mine accidents, Black Lung disease has
disabled thousands of miners. In response to the demands of
Black Lung Associations and small groups of doctors, federal
Black Lung legislation was passed in 1969. Despite Black Lung
legislation, thousands of totally disabled miners have not received
their benefits. Administrative responsibility for Black Lung
Compensation rests with the Social Security Administration,
which has, up to now, succumbed to coal-interest pressure to deny
miners their benefits. The coal companies apparently fear
that they will eventually bear the financial burden of Black
Lung disease or will be forced to correct the mining techniques
that create it. At the present time, however, Black Lung
compensation is paid out of general federal tax revenue. In
other words, the U.S. taxpayer is paying for the neglect of the
coal industry. Furthermore, legal fees are frequently skimmed
off of the payments going to the former miners or their widows.
In a typical eastern Kentucky case a miner who had applied for
Black Lung benefits since 1969 would be told by the Social
Security office in his cointy that he needed a lawyer to represent
him at his hearing. Lawyers, approached by these men or their
widows would agree to represent them for 25% to 45% of the settle-
ment. Since the settlements are retro-active, payments from
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applications filed in 1969 can be as high as $10,000. Thus some
lawyers have received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the
tax revenues intended for the disabled miners and widows.( 1 8 )
The federal tax system also grants special tax benefits to
the coal industry as a whole. First, coal operators benefit from
a ten percent depletion allowance. The operators can base this
depletion allowance, furthermore, on the cost of mining the coal,
the cost of preparing, breaking and sizing it, and the cost of
transporting it up to fifty miles! The cost of constructing
transportation networks, such as short-haul railroads, thus comes
under this depletion allowance. This tax benefit can shelter up
to one-half of the individual's or companies income and costs the
federal treasury an estimated $40--$50 million a year.(19)
In addition, mineral owners are given an additional tax
benefit. Income from coal royalty payments can be treated as
capital gains income and, therdfore, taxed at the 25% rate-- or
one-half the normal rate. The federal treasury, as a result,
loses an estimated $5--$8 million a year. (20)
Another tax benefit to coal operators was enacted in 1969.
The 1969 Coal Mine Health and Safety Act included an important
amendment. The National Coal Association fought for and won
an amendment which allows five-year amortization of new mine safety
equipment.(21) This means that the total cost of new mining
equipment which the companies classify as "safety" equipment
can be subtracted from their net income over a five-year period.
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One financial report commented that this "legislation could be
beneficial to the larger companies ,because it tends to drive out
the marginal producer."(
2 2 )
The combination of these tax benefits allows coal companies -
particularly the large ones - to pay little or no taxes. Some
companies even report tax credits. Eastern Gas and Fuel, for
example, reported tax credits in 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970 on its
mining operations in Kentucky and West Virginia.(2 3 )
One counter-movement in the area of state and federal taxation
has been the increasing interest in severance taxation on coal.
Early proponents of severance taxation hoped that the revenue raised
from this tax on coal could be plowed back into the region's economy.
In 1972, the Kentucky legislature passed a state severance tax on
coal, imposing a tax of 4% on gross income from coal production with
a minimum of thirty cents per ton.(2 4 ) Unfortunately, the Kentucky
law funnels the money into a general fund with no money going back
to the mountains. The possible effect of this tax is to mdke
Kentucky coal less competitive than it was before. Therefore, in 1972
and in January, 1973, Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky proposed a
national severance tax on coal. Cook's proposal also would not
(25)
plow the money back into producing regions.' Without price
controls, Cook's proposal would allow the companies to pass on the
severance tax to coal consumers (largely electric utilities).
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Government involvement in Appalachia that has received the
widest recognition has been the various public service, public
works, transfer payment, vocational education and job training
programs that have come into the region since the Depression.
Close examination of these programs shows.,however,, that, as a whole,
they have also served to maintain the dualistic system in the region.
If transfer payments and public service employment income
were to rise substantially above the subsistence level, a contradic-
tion in the political economy of the region could occur. With
income in the subsistence sector pushed up, wages in the capitalist
sector would also have to rise. However, since the Work Projects
Administration and the National Youth Administration programs came
into the area during the Depression, 26 ) income from public service
employment and transfer payments have hovered around the subsistence
level. In 1971, the average monthly A.F.D.C. payment in Kentucky
was $32.65 per recipient.(2 7 ) In 1970, the Manpower Development
and Training Act programs payed $64 a week to working fathers. 28)
Even though good data is not available on the distribution of above-
subsistence government jobs by income class, evidence presented
earlier indicates that those jobs are generally available to those
who already are in the upper portion of the region's income distri-
bution.
The Appalachian Regional Commission's highway development
program follows the same pattern as the other programs. When a highway
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passes through a county, the high-paid and stable jobs are held by
skilled workers who are generally not from the area and the low-skill,
low-paying temporary jobs go to people from the county. Once they
are completed ,the roads will not be suitable for local use since
they have very limited access. The rationale for highway construction
has been that reduction of transportation costs will attract higher-
paying industry to the area.(29) There is, however, no convincing
evidence available from the A.R.C. indicating that this will come
about -- this will not be known for a number of years. These highways
may be useful for other purposes, however. The existance of fast
roads into and out of the region may permit workers, who would other-
wise stay in the mountains to migrate to cities for work and return
to their families on weekends. In addition, up until now, the larger
strip mining machines have not been able to move into eastern
Kentucky because of its narrow roads. With these new highways,
eastern Kentucky may begin to witness the coming of the really
large earth moving machines.
The final major involvement that government has had in
Appalachian Kentucky's political economy has been in education.
The drop out rate in Appalachian Kentucky's counties remains
high - some counties report that as many as 65% of the students
(28)
drop out before graduation. Most of these drop-outs, along
with unemployed high school graduates, are forced to migrate to find
work. (29) When the schools are successful -- for the 40% or so who
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do graduate -- the young people are being prepared for higher education
or jobs outside the region. The "cream of the crop" who attend
higher education find institutions encouraging them to get "educated"
to enable them to leave the region "instead of promoting a regional
consciousness on the part of this potential leadership..." (30)
Vocational education has been seen by many as a panacea for
the region's educational problems. The effort so far has been a
failure. "Students are frequently trained for jobs which do not exist,
and are not trained for those that are available...',(31) Even the
efforts that are successful train students in skills that can be
utilized only if they move out of the region.
James Branscome, a man who has studied the entire Appalachian
region's education systems concludes that "Once they are educated
and/or trained, Appalachia's young people move away because they believe
that nothing can be done to change the way of life that they are
escaping..."(32) The schools have performed an important role in
developing that consciousness. The schools "send the culturally
different student -- ashamed of his background and ill-equipped to
meet the needs of his region -- into middle-class society outside the
region or out of productive society entirely."(
3 3 )
The trend in manpower programs, vocational education, and
public education leads to suspicions of a comprehensive "de-population"
program developing. If these programs achieved their goals today,
that would be their effect. And there is no assurance that leaving
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the region will make the people better off, as Dr. Robert Coles,( 3 4)
James Branscome,(35) and other literature(36) point out.
De-population efforts may reflect a belief on the part of
economists like Niles Hansen that economic welfare and efficiency
can be best achieved by developing medium-sized cities outside the
region -- the "growth pole" theory. 37) Or, de-population efforts
might reflect an insistence in America that children must become
melting pot products -- Appalachian children are, for the most part,
"white". Or, de-population efforts may be a deliberate effort on
the part of coal interests to clear the hollows for their strip mine
machines -- large amounts of unskilled labor, after all, are no longer
necessary. Whatever the intent, the Appalachian people, like the
Cherokee people before them, may no longer be necessary; and, in
fact, might just get in the way of further "development". Indications
are that government, through its manpower, education, and economic
development programs will, once again, grease the path for further
capitalist exploitation of the region -- this time, though, without
the people.
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STRIP AWAY
Strip away, big D-9 Dozer, comin for to bury my home
I'm gettin madder as you're gettin closer
Comin for to bury my home.
When I looked up a spoil bank and what did I see
Comin for to bury my home
The Island Creek Company pushin down my trees
Comin for to bury my home.
They're goin to turn our mountain homeland to acid-clay
Comin for to bury my home
To make a cheaper rate for the TVA
Comin for to bury my home.
Well, boys, we gotta organize against them stripmine men
Comin for to bury our homes
And the broad-form deed that always lets them win
Comin for to bury our homes.
Strip way, big D-9 Dozer, comin for to bury our homes
We're all gettin madder as you're gettin closer
Comin for to bury my home. .
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- CHAPTER 6
DIALECTICS OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
The struggle over the direction that economic development
will take in Appalachia is continuing - and the stakes may be getting
higher. The move to strip mining techniques represents a higher
stage of capitalist economic development. Efforts are underway to
remove the people from the hollows and, ultimately, from the region.
Huge machines requiring small numbers of imported, skilled workers
are being brought into Appalachian Kentucky. If these efforts
continue, the hollows will become virtual "free fire zones" from
which the mighty machines will be free to extract the coal (or, to
borrow another military phrase, to "search and destroy").
Overshadowing all of this is the so-called "Energy Crisis."
We are told daily that we are running out of energy by multinational
energy companies on television and in newspaper advertisements.
Paralleling the Energy Crisis we are also faced with an "Environmental
Crisis". Coal, particularly high sulfur Appalachian coal, is a
"dirty" energy source . The combination of these two crises has
made the future of Appalachia highly uncertain. There seems to be
a dilemma: Or the one hand, If th ultinational energy corp r tions
have their way, the Appalachian hills will be ripped apart and the
people removed. On the other hand, environmentalists seem to be
pushing for laws that would create high unemployment and widespread
poverty in the eastern coal fields.
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Countering the energy strategy of the multinationals and
their White House friends, the U.M.W. of A. President Arnold Miller,
has begun to take positions on the two crises:
"...we face an energy crisis today because government has
failed to develop a national approach to our energy needs ,
but has instead allowed corporate interests to develop
and supply the nation's energy in accordance with their
instincts for profit alone. As a result, we have become
heavily dependent on unstable foreign sources of oil; we
have failed to develop effective research to utilize our
vast reserves of high sulfur underground coal; we have
promoted a lopsided commitment to the development of
nuclear power which has consistently failed to yield its
promised rewards; and we have permitted major oil interests
to develop monopoly control of the major sources of energy
on which we depend as a nation.... Coal miners don't want
to be pitted against environmentalists in a battle between
jobs and clean air. But that's what present government
ensures(1)
While the U.M.W. of A. has begun to challenge national energy
policy, grass-roots groups in the mountains are also continuing to
challenge the relations of production in the coal fields. The most
widespread of these are the anti-stripmine groups such as "Save our
Kentucky" (SOK) and "Save Our Cumberland Mountains" (SOCM). These
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groups have two general goals: first, stopping all stripmining and
the ability of the broad-form deed to apply to stripmining; and,
second, invalidation of the broad-form deed altogether, and, therefore,
the legal basis of mineral ownership in the mountains.
These grass-roots organizations have used both legal and
direct-action strategies. The record has.been disappointing for
anti-strip mining and anti-broad-form deed efforts in the courts.
In Kentucky, all nine cases involving the broad-form deed have been
decided in favor of coal interests. (2) Scattered direct-action
confrontations have impeded continued strip mining on peoples' land -
such as the case of Warren Wright in Burdine, Kentucky. But these
small-scale challenges have been, on the whole, ineffective since
they have confronted an ownership pattern sactioned by legal, corporate,
and police power.
The future of Appalachia is not, however, as dismal as all
of this may make it seem. The new U.M.W. of A. leadership is vitally
interested in the region and its people and has, thus far, been
responsive to the demands of rank-and-file miners. In addition,
the U.M.W. of A. has begun to support unionization efforts of non-mining
workers in the region.(3)
Regional consciousness has also begun to emerge among
Appalachia's.young people as the basis of a political/economic move-
ment. The Peoples Appalachian Research Collective (PARC) in Morgantown,
West Virginia, publishes a monthly journal that discusses issues such
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as urban migration, "regionalization" of the coal industry for future
development, creation of a mineral-based economy, Appalachian
history, research and political organizing methods, etc. PARC,
along with the Appalachian Movement Press in Huntington, West
Virginia, are providing vital "consciousness-raising" functions in
the new Appalachian movement.
Consciousness-raising is also beginning to spread into
political activity. Last year, Bill Worthington , a black coal miner
from Harlan, Kentucky, and President of the Kentucky Black Lung
Association, ran for congress in Kentucky's Fifth Congressional
District. Bessie Smith, former President of "Save our Kentucky"
ran for Congress from Kentucky's seventh congressional district.
In West Virginia, the "Peoples' Party" has formed and will be running
candidates for office. These are all small beginnings, but many
people are prepared for a long struggle. The Appalachian movement
is up against one hundred years of history.
Capitalist economic development has created and maintained
poverty in Appalachia. One hundred years of capitalist development
has impoverished the mountain people; has forced others to work in
slave-like conditions; has fueled this nation's industrial expansion;
has met the energy demands of our cities; and has yielded enormous
profits to coal operators, mineral owners, and, now, multinational
energy conglomerates. With the energy and environmental crises accelera-
ting and the Appalachian movement growing, a new era of struggle has
begun in the mountains.
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March 1973, pp. 1,3.
4. See Peoples' Appalachia, Peoples' Appalachian Research Collective,
Rt. 3, Box 355B, Morgantown, W. Va., 36505, 1971-1973.
*1
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THEY CAN'T PUT IT BACK
Down in the valley bout a mile from me
Where the crow no longer fly,
There's a great big earth-movin monster-machine
Stands ten stories high.
The ground he can eat, it's a sight;
He can rip out a hundred tons at a bite.
He can eat up the grass, it's a fact,
BUT HE CAN'T PUT IT BACK.
They come and tell me I've got to move
Make way for that big machine;
But I ain't a-movin unless they kill me,
like they killed the fish in my stream.
But look at that big machine go;
Took that shady grove a long time to grow.
He can rip it out with one whack
BUT HE CAN'T PUT IT BACK.
I never was one to walk in lines,
Picket with plackards, or carry signs,
But maybe I'm behind the times.
You can bet your sweet life you're goin to hear from me;
I ain't a-goin to take it layin down,
Cause I'm tired of seein rocks that bleed
On the bare guts of the ground.
And I ain't sellin my soul
So they can strip out another tiny little vein of coal.
And I ain't a-movin out of my tracks,
Cause they can't put it back,
THEY CAN'T PUT IT BACK....
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Appendix A
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their
will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage
of development of their material productive forces. The sum total
of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure
of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions
the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but,
on the contrary, their social being that determines their conscious-
ness. At a certain stage of their development, the material pro-
ductive forces of society come in conflict with the existing rela-
tions of production or - what is but a legal expression for the same
thing - with the property relations within which they have been
at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces
these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of
social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the
entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.
In considering such transformations a distinction should always be
made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of
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production, which can be determined with the precision of natural
science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -
in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this
conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is
not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such
a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary,
this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions
of material life, from the existing conflict between the social
productive forces and the relations of production. No social order
ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is
room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production
never appear before the material conditions of their existence have
matured in the womb of the old society itself.
Source: Karl Marx, "Preface to a Contribution To the Critique of
Political Economy", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected
Works, International Publishers, New York, 1970, pp.18 2-1 8 3 .
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Appendix B
ADVANTAGES OF MACHINE COAL MINING
The mining machine not only revolutionizes the methods of
work, but it equally changes the system of wages. The coal miner
proper takes his own tools into the pit, and undertakes to deliver
from the wall of mineral before him certain tons of coal ready for
market, for a certain sum per ton. His earnings depend upon him-
self, and the better the man, the better the pay. He mines and
drills and blasts and loads his own coal, timbers his own roof,
takes care of his own tools and is responsible mainly to himself
both for his personal safety and the amount of his output.
In the machine mine it takes seven or eight men to perform
these various functions, and, in the mine as in the mill, the machine
is the master and the men are its servitors. The operator of the
mechanism simply directs its energies, when the motive power is
given to it, and the coal is undercut or mined; the blaster follows
with drills and explosives to loosen the mass; the loaders reduce
it and shovel it into pit-cars; the timbermen follow and prop the
roof which no longer has the mineral to rest upon; laborers assist in
every process, and a machinist is retained for repairs. Each one
does his certain portion of the work and no more, and doubtless does
it better as well as faster by reason of his greater skill thus
acquired; but this is only one small talent at the best, and chiefly
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consists in that sort of activity and smartness, which is common to
all good workmen, and which qualifies any good workman to take his
place. Herein lies the chief value of the machine to the mine owner.
It relieves him for the most part of the skilled labor, and of all
the restraints which that implies; it opens to him the whole labor
market from which to recruit his forces, it enables him to concen-
trate the work of the mines at given points, and it admits of the
graduation of wages to specific work, and the payment of wages by
the day. These conditions signify a more effective organization of
the working force, and doubtless reduce the ultimate cost of production
even though the output be not materially increased.
Source: Seward, The Coal Trade, 1890, p. 80.
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Appendix C
SAVE-THE-UNION COMMITTEE STATEMENT - 1928
The National Coference of the Save the Union Committee of
the UMWA made up of 1125 delegates representing the overwhelming
sentiment of the masses of organized and unorganized miners in
this country, was called to take measures to meet the life and death
crisis in which the miners find themselves. Wage cuts, unemploy-
ment, evictions,jailing, starvation are the order of the day in the
mining districts. Betrayed by their reactionary union leaders, the
miners are facing a gigantic conspiracy of the big coal operators,
the powerful railroad and financial interests, backed fully by the
Federal and State Governments. The issues at stake are of profound
importance not only to the great body of miners but also to every
worker, organized and unorganized, in this country...
The great body of miners, organized as well as unorganized
are being rapidly forced into the depths of poverty. Today the coal-
mining camps of this country...are saturated with misery and suffering,
often verging into actual starvation...
As a 'remedy' for this situation, the coal operators, many
of whom are even now reaping large profits, propose to sink the miners
into veritable serfdom. They demand special governmental support to
wipe out competition among themselves and to establish monopoly
conditions. [This they have succeeded in accomplishing in large measure.]
-139-
They demand the destruction of the union and the establishment of
the open shop so that they may have a free hand to introduce their
whole program of cutting wages, lengthening hour3, speeding up
production, and the elimination of safety devices, checkweighmen
and many other job protections establshed by the miners after a
generation of struggle. To the unemployed they brutally declare:
'There are too many miners: 250,000 of you must get out of the in-
dustry.' The semi-slave camps of the southern coal mining districts
are an indication of what conditions the mine operators seek to
force upon the whole body of miners...
Workers, the Save the Union National Conference asks your
solidarity and support. This is your fight as well as ours. The
outcome of this struggle will be of the most profound significance
to the whole American working class, unorganized as well as organized.
It is a struggle of basic importance internationally, and we appeal
to the miners and other workers throughout the world to rally to our
support.
The crisis of the UMWA is the crisis of the entire American
labor movement. If the Miners Union, the foundation of organized
labor, is destroyed, every trade union in the country will be in
danger. The downfall of the UMWA would be the signal for an elimina-
tion struggle against trade unions in every industry by the open-shop
forces. If the miners are forced into semi-slave conditions, every
worker in America will feel the effects of it in wage cuts and generally
worsened conditions.
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The fight against the Lewis Machine is the fight against the
whole reactionary and corrupt leadership in the trade unions. If
this struggle is lost, it means that our unions, sunk still deeper
in the morass of reaction, will be helpless and will go down before
the open-shop attacks of the employers. If the fight is won, our
trade unions will go into a new period of progress and development..."
Source: reprinted in "Coal Fields Struggle History", Peoples Appalachia,
Vol. 3, No. 3, Winter 1972-73, pp. 40-41.
F",
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Appendix D
TECHNOLOGICAL DUALISM
Technological dualism's explanation of unemployment in the
"advanced" sector can be represented by the following diagram:
(~) E
According to the above diagram, if the actual factor endowment is to
the right of the OE line (expansion path of the sector), then there
must be unemployment of labor in this sector. To produce q, only
OKi of capital and OL, of labor are needed even if OL2 of labor are
available. The excess labor L1L2 will have no effect on production
techniques and will remain unemployed in the sector regardless of
the relative factor prices of labor and capital. L2 can be fully
employed only if FF' capital stock is available; otherwise the
excess labor will either remain unemployed or find employment in
the subsistence sector. LL 9 , the "reserve army" of labor is
dependent on the amount of capital stock available. Introduction of
new technology is represented by a bending of the expansion line OE
toward the K axis, creating more unemployment in the sector.
Source: G.M. Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1964, p.69 .
